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ABSTRACT 
 
New Zealand‟s figures for child maltreatment are consistently amongst the 
highest in the OECD. The purpose of this thesis is to understand what the 
legal system can do to protect children in New Zealand from maltreatment 
and why legal responses to child maltreatment often appear to be 
ineffectual or of limited effect.   
 
This thesis uses the theories of Luhman and Teubner to argue that the 
law‟s ability to protect children from maltreatment is limited because the 
legal system creates and responds to its own abstract world.  This process 
arises from the functional requirements of the law and its operation as an 
autopoietic system of power that produces its own abstract knowledge 
about the world.  The legal system‟s function within New Zealand society 
is to stabilise behavioural expectations and maintain society‟s coherence 
and it does so by reducing the complexity of subjective human existence 
into binary alternatives.  However, this process of reducing complexity 
limits the way in which the law produces its knowledge about the world 
and controls how power is distributed within the law‟s abstract world to 
such an extent that the legal system is closed from the world of subjective 
experience.  This closure from the world outside the legal system limits the 
law‟s ability to regulate and reform that outside world and protect the 
children who live within it.  By identifying these limits, this thesis will 
contribute to an understanding of the limits of the law's ability to protect 
children from maltreatment and thereby improve the effectiveness of New 
Zealand society's attempts to protect its children. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
As a parent of young children, I read with particular dismay reports 
showing New Zealand‟s figures for child maltreatment to be consistently 
amongst the highest in the OECD.1 As a lawyer, I question what the law 
can do to protect children in New Zealand from such maltreatment and I 
wonder why legal responses to child maltreatment often appear to be 
ineffectual or, at least, of limited effect.  These questions were the catalyst 
for this thesis. 
 
In this thesis I will argue that the legal system is limited in its ability to 
protect children from maltreatment because it creates and responds to its 
own world, rather than the world as experienced by children and adults.  
As a result, although the legal system can impose consequences for the 
breach of its normative standards, it is ineffective in proactively changing 
behaviour and reforming society.  By examining these issues, I hope that 
this thesis will contribute to a deeper understanding of how the law 
operates and the limitations of the legal system as a tool of social reform.  
 
In chapter two I will establish the theoretical basis for my argument that 
the law creates its own world. I will examine the systems theories of 
Luhman and Teubner, both of whom begin with the proposition that the 
legal system‟s function within modern society is to stabilise behavioural 
expectations, and that it does so by reducing the complexity of subjective 
human experience into abstract binary alternatives. They argue that these 
reductive processes limit the way in which the law produces its knowledge 
about the world to such an extent that the law creates its own abstract 
world, a world closed from the subjective experiences of those subject to 
it.  Furthermore, because the law responds to problems such as child 
maltreatment on the basis of this limited and abstract vision of the world, it 
                                            
1 UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, “Child Poverty in Perspective: An Overview of 
Child Well-being in Rich Countries, Innocenti Report Card 7, 2007” viewed at 
<http://www.unicef-ird.org/cgi_bin/unicef/download_insert.sql?ProductID=494> (3 July 
2008), 16.  
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is unable to reform society by communicating its normative requirements 
in any meaningful, proactive way.  I will conclude this chapter by 
acknowledging that Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims that the legal system 
is operationally closed from society is criticised by other theorists, 
particularly by Jurgen Habermas. 
 
In chapter three I will review Habermas‟ alternative theory for describing 
the relationship between law and society.  Habermas argues that 
knowledge is created through a process he describes as „communicative 
action‟.  For Habermas, communicative action is the foundation of modern 
democracy and the law‟s legitimacy.  Habermas therefore argues that the 
knowledge the law produces is the result of communicative action, not the 
result of the law‟s operative closure.  Consequently, he argues that the law 
is able to regulate society because it is not an operationally closed system 
but, through its genesis in the participatory processes of modern 
democracy, exists in a symbiotic relationship with society.  
 
In chapters two and three I will therefore present two alternative theories 
for describing the relationship between law and society.  The first will claim 
that the law produces its own world to meet its own functional 
requirements and is consequently unable to regulate the outside world.  In 
contrast, the second theory will claim that the law and society have a 
symbiotic relationship through democratic processes of communicative 
action and that the law is able to regulate society. The subsequent 
chapters will investigate two particular operations of the legal system to 
determine which of these two theoretical approaches offers the most 
explanatory power for describing how the law operates in practice.  I will 
investigate how the law produces knowledge about children and how the 
law redistributes power by recognising rights.  These investigations are 
significant because the law can only protect children from maltreatment if it 
is able to regulate society. 
 
In chapter four I will focus on how the law produces its knowledge about 
children by using conceptions of childhood.  I will argue that Luhman‟s and 
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Teubner‟s theories explain the way in which the law uses conceptions of 
childhood to construct children as objects that meet the legal system‟s 
functional requirements.  I will also argue that Habermas‟ theory fails to 
incorporate Foucault‟s insight that “power produces knowledge.”2 I will 
argue that the law is engaged in an exercise of power when it produces its 
own world using conceptions of childhood. Furthermore, the knowledge it 
produces generally serves the needs of the legal system itself, not the 
needs of children.  I will argue that this result is predicted by Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s theories as they accept the exclusion of children from the law‟s 
knowledge creation process.  However, because Habermas‟ theory is 
based on participation, it fails to account for the law‟s production of 
knowledge about human beings, such as children, who do not participate 
in the knowledge creation processes of communicative action. I will 
conclude this chapter by arguing that the law attempts to empower 
children by granting them legal rights.  
 
In chapter five I will examine the role of rights within the legal system.  I 
will argue that granting rights to children is an attempt to redistribute power 
to them in order to empower them to participate in the production of 
knowledge about their lives. Rights advocates attempt to use the law to 
redistribute power to children because the legal system promises to 
exercise power on the behalf of rights-holders.  However, I will argue that 
the effectiveness of legal rights as a mechanism for redistributing power is 
entirely dependent on the law‟s ability to communicate and enforce this 
transfer of power outside the world of the law.  In chapter five I will argue 
that granting rights to children can fail to achieve this transfer of power 
because of the legal system‟s operative closure as described by Luhman 
and Teubner.     
 
After examining a variety of theoretical arguments in the first five chapters, 
I will examine two areas of the law in practice.  In chapter six I will 
examine how the law is created, by examining the recent amendment to s 
59 of the Crimes Act 1961. I will argue that the process of law reform 
                                            
2
 Foucault, M Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (trans) Sheridan, A (1995) 
27. 
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evident from the s 59 amendment process supports Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s claims that the law operates as a closed system. I will also 
show that Habermas‟ theory offers a useful critique of how law reform 
processes operate within the political system. In chapter seven I will 
examine how the law is applied by examining some recent cases of child 
maltreatment.  I will argue that these cases also confirm Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s claims that the law operates as a closed system. 
 
I will conclude this thesis by arguing that the cases, reports and law reform 
processes examined in chapters six and seven support Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s claims that the law creates its own world, is closed within that 
world and is consequently limited in its ability to respond to the needs of 
children in the outside world. I will also argue that Habermas‟ theory is 
more of an ideal than a description of actual practice. These factors limit 
the law‟s ability to protect children and I will therefore argue that New 
Zealand society can improve its attempts to protect children by 
recognising the limits of legal intervention and focusing on the causes of 
child maltreatment.  Finally, on the basis of Habermas‟ insights, I will also 
argue that it is important for law reform processes designed to protect 
children to actively engage with the general community in order to improve 
the law‟s perceived validity. 
 
A common theme throughout this thesis is the role of power in shaping 
both the law and society.  This theme is founded on Derrida‟s claim that 
differences between individuals in society are fundamentally differences in 
social power.3  Society and the law generally treat children differently from 
adults and this difference reflects, in part, a difference in the ability of 
children to exercise social power.  At the risk of generalising, adults have 
power (even if not absolute) whereas children have little or no power over 
their lives.  Children are unable to exercise many of the freedoms that 
adults take for granted.  In many ways, children are powerless.  In 
contrast, the law is a system founded on the exercise of power.  In this 
                                            
3
 Derrida, J “The Force of Law: The „Mystical Foundation of Authority‟” in Cornell, D 
Rosenfeld, M and Carlson, D G (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (1992) 
7. 
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thesis I will argue that many of the limitations the law faces when 
responding to child maltreatment are the result of using a system of power 
such as the law to respond to the needs of the powerless.4  
 
Joseph Goldstein comments that: 
 
 There is attributed to the law a magical power, a capacity to do what is far 
beyond its means.  While the law may claim to establish relationships, it 
can, in fact, do little more than acknowledge them and give them 
recognition.  It may be able to destroy human relationships, but it cannot 
compel them to develop.5 
 
The law has no magical power to prevent maltreatment; it is limited in its 
ability to respond to the needs of children and to reform society.  I hope 
that, by identifying these limits, this thesis will contribute to developing an 
understanding of what the law is capable of and to the development of a 
more effective and holistic approach to protecting children in New Zealand 
from maltreatment. 
                                            
4
 Children are not the only powerless members of our society.  The limitations identified in 
this thesis could also apply to the law‟s response to the needs of other members of our 
society who have little or no power. 
5
 Goldstein J. S. “Finding the Least Detrimental Alternative” Psychoanalytic Study of the 
Child 628, at 736 (1972) quoted in Rodham, H “Children Under the Law” in Freeman, M 
(ed) Children’s Rights: Volume 1 (The International Library of Essays on Rights) (2004) 
36. 
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Chapter 2   The Law is a Closed System 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will argue that the law operates as a system that is closed 
from other systems in society.  This argument has significant implications 
when considering what the law can do to protect children from 
maltreatment. If the law operates as a closed system then it has, at best, a 
limited ability to protect children.  If this argument is correct, it may explain 
why law reforms have often failed to change or improve the position of 
children within our society.6   
 
My argument that the law operates as an autonomous system is based on 
the systems theories of Niklas Luhman and Gunther Teubner.  I will 
therefore examine their theories in some detail in this chapter. 
 
2.2 What are systems theories? 
 
Since the 1960s, theorists within both the physical and social sciences 
have argued that organisations, both physical and social, are often „more 
than the sum of their parts‟.7  These theorists argue that the facts of 
organisation impart 
 
 to the aggregate characteristics that are not only different from, but often 
not found in the components alone; and the „sum of the parts‟ must be 
taken to mean, not their numerical addition, but their unorganised 
aggregation.8 
 
The fact that organised systems are different from their constituent parts, 
is significant as it implies that the current state of any system can not be 
                                            
6
 Rodham, H “Children Under the Law” in Freeman, M (ed) Children’s Rights: Volume 1 
(The International Library of Essays on Rights) (2004) 33. 
7
 Buckley, W Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (1967) 42. 
8
 Ibid. 
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determined by simple deduction from its initial condition.9  Systems 
theories deal with the problems of causation within complex organisations 
by refusing to focus on linear chains of causation but on interrelationships 
between complex elements within the system.10 Systems themselves are 
thereby given ontological significance beyond their constituent parts and 
are treated as entities in themselves that consist of well-ordered elements 
that tend to maintain their organisational boundaries.11  Boundaries are 
therefore particularly significant to systems theories as systems maintain 
their organisational coherence by defining their boundaries and what 
information or behaviour is acceptable within those boundaries.12  
 
2.3 Does the law operate as a social system? 
 
Niklas Luhman and Gunther Teubner have developed and applied 
theories regarding the nature of systems generally to describe the 
operations of the law. They argue that the law is a system and that its 
function is to integrate society by stabilising congruent expectations.  To 
achieve this function, the legal system reduces complexity to manageable 
proportions so that its normative communications will be acceptable to 
society.13 The legal system‟s functional requirement to reduce complexity 
is therefore a fundamental element of Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories. 
They argue that this functional requirement leads to operative closure 
because, to reduce complexity, the legal system must re-interpret 
knowledge from outside the legal system to meet its own „truth‟ criteria.14   
 
Luhman and Teubner begin with the proposition that although truth may 
exist, it is not directly accessible.15  However, concepts of truth are 
required for the law to function.  Consequently, Luhman and Teubner 
argue, the law as a system develops its own formal procedures to 
                                            
9
 Ibid, 39. 
10
 Ibid, 80. 
11
 Flecha, R Gomez, J and Puigvert, L Contemporary Sociological Theory (2001) 8. 
12
 Giles-Sam, J Wife Battering: A Systems Theory Approach (1983) 9. 
13
 King, M and Piper, C How the Law Thinks About Children (1995) 29 and 32. 
14
 Ibid, 34. 
15
 Ibid, 22.   
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determine the concepts of truth that are relevant for its own functional 
requirements.16   
 
This understanding of truth, and the importance of formal procedures and 
functional requirements for the identification of legally valid „truth‟, is 
fundamental to Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories.  Within their theories, 
the legal system establishes its boundaries through formal procedures and 
thereby maintains its organisational coherence.  This understanding of 
truth also combines with a reification of the legal system to produce a 
purely objective understanding of the nature of law and its interaction with 
individual human beings and society in general.  Luhman and Teubner 
argue that the law does not develop its concepts of truth and meaning 
from the subjective perspectives of participants within the legal system.  
Rather, they argue that the legal system gives its own meaning to the 
behaviour of human actors.  The law therefore relegates individual human 
beings to a role as “the structural interface between social and psychic 
systems.”17   
 
In contrast to positive law theorists who define „the law‟ by reference to 
specific structural rules (H. L. A. Hart‟s rule of recognition for example18), 
Luhman argues that „the law‟ needs to be defined by reference to its 
operations and how those operations distinguish between the legal system 
and its environment.19  Luhman “assumes” that these operations “always 
have to be the operations of the legal system itself”20 and this forms the 
basis of his argument that the legal system is operatively closed. 
Luhman‟s theory is therefore an attempt (which he acknowledges is 
“structurally complex”21) to develop a theory able to clearly distinguish law 
from its environment and it does so by positing that the law uses its own 
processes for determining „truth‟. 
 
                                            
16
 Ibid, 22. 
17
 Flecha, Gomez, and Puigvert, supra n 11 at 27. 
18
 Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law (1994) 56. 
19
 Luhman, N Law as a Social System (trans) Zeigert, K (2004), 78.  
20
 Ibid, 78. 
21
 Ibid, 70. 
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The idea that discourses such as the law develop their own formal 
procedures for determining the truthfulness of any statement leads to the 
reification of systems themselves.  Teubner, for example, argues that:  
 
 [S]ocial organisations and institutions think, and … this thinking is 
different to, and independent of, the thinking of its individual members.22 
 
Teubner argues that this „thinking‟ proceeds on a self-referential basis; 
that is, systems develop processes to determine the validity of truth claims 
within the system but the validity of these processes is determined by 
referring to processes within the system itself.23  The effect of this self-
referential process is that legal rules take on a „life of their own‟ and no 
longer operate as a legal means to social ends, but as ends in 
themselves.24   
 
Teubner argues that, although legal rules may initially represent 
underlying social values, over time they develop, through self-referential 
processes of production and maintenance, to exclude references to the 
social environment altogether.25  This process is evident in New Zealand 
through the system of precedent that is an integral part of our common 
law system.  The self-referential nature of the system of precedent serves 
to entrench the perspectives of those in positions of power, traditionally 
white, middle-class men.26  The self-referential nature of the legal system 
itself allows this perspective to become synonymous with normative 
standards such as the normative standard of the „reasonable man‟.27 
 
The self-referential nature of systems creates particularly difficult 
theoretical problems for the legal system.  Both Luhman and Teubner 
                                            
22
 King and Piper, supra n 13 at 23. 
23
 Ibid, 25. 
24
 Teubner, G Law as an Autopoietic System (1993) 40. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Davies, M Asking the Law Question (1994) 148. 
27
 A concept developed in cases such as Hall v. Brooklands Auto-Racing Club (1933) 1 
KB 205 with its reference to the “man on the Clapham omnibus” to set an „objective‟ 
standard of foreseeability in cases of negligence.  See also Davies, supra n 26 at 148. 
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argue that the legal system‟s function within modern society is to resolve 
the conflicts that arise as a consequence of divergent expectations.28 To 
do so, the law reduces the complexity of human life by employing the 
fundamental normative distinction between what is legal and what is not.29  
However, as noted by Teubner: 
 
 As soon as the simple distinction between legal and illegal is applied in 
any context whatsoever, self-reference poses a threat to the law.  If the 
distinction between legal and illegal is applied … with claims to 
universality, then at some stage it will be applied to itself.30   
 
This reveals a fundamental paradox that lies at the heart of the legal 
system: the law itself determines its own legality.  Luhman and Teubner 
attempt to explain this paradox by arguing that the law operates as a 
social system.  This enables them to apply the concept of autopoiesis 
developed by Maturana and Varela in the context of the biological 
systems.31 Teubner claims that the concept of autopoiesis avoids the 
taboo against circularity that creates logical difficulties for the conception 
of law as a fundamentally self-referential system.32  Rather than regarding 
the circularity of law as a fault, autopoiesis regards circularity as a 
“productive and heuristically valuable practice”.33 
 
2.4 What is autopoiesis? 
 
Maturana and Varela initially defined an autopoietic system (or, in their 
case, an autopoietic biological „machine‟) as: 
 
 [A] network of processes of production … of components which: (i) 
through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate 
                                            
28
 Teubner, supra n 24 at 38.  King and Piper, supra n 13 at 29. 
29
 Davies, M Delimiting the Law: ‘Postmodernism’ and the Politics of Law (1996) 6. 
30
 Teubner, supra n 24 at 4. 
31
 Flecha, Gomez, and Puigvert, supra n 11 at 27. 
32
 As noted by Teubner, another way to address the paradox of self-reference is by 
radical critique and deconstruction. (Teubner, supra n 11 at 8.)  Derrida, for example, 
took this approach by identifyin contradictions in the law; infra at 25.  Other theorists such 
as H.L.A Hart, with his „rule of recognition‟ have established theories based on self-
reference that have been critiqued as „logical contraditions‟; see Davies, supra n 29 at 27. 
33
 Teubner, supra n 24 at 9. 
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and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and 
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they 
(the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its 
realization as such a network.34 
 
Applying this concept to the social sciences is a challenge.35  Luhman 
began his application by arguing that the fundamental component of the 
legal system is not the human actors involved (judges, lawyers, clients etc) 
but the communications between such actors.36 Luhman (and, 
subsequently, Teubner) therefore conceptualised the legal system 
primarily as a system of meaning generated through communication.37  
This system of meaning operates autopoietically because: 
 
 [T]he law produces by itself all the distinctions and concepts which it 
uses, and … the unity of law is nothing but the fact of this self-production, 
this „autopoiesis‟.38 
 
It is clear from Maturana and Varela‟s definition that autopoiesis is more 
than simple self-reference as an autopoietic system not only refers to itself 
but is actively involved in its own regeneration and transformation. 
Teubner argues that autopoiesis involves self-reference, self-description, 
self-reflection, self-organisation, self-regulation and self-production.39  
Understanding the distinctions and relationships between these concepts 
is the key to understanding the Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories of 
autopoiesis.  
 
Self-reference is the general concept underlying systems theories.  It 
refers to systems consisting of rules that refer to other rules within the 
same system for their validity.40 However, Luhman notes that such 
                                            
34
 Maturana, Varela, Autopoiesis and cognition: the realization of the living  (1980) 78. 
35
 Teubner, supra n 24 at 27. 
36
 Luhman, supra n 19 at 74. 
37
 Ibid, 29. 
38
 Ibid, 70. 
39
 Teubner, supra n 24 at 16.  As noted by Habermas, this emphasis on the self creates 
“a narcissistically self-enclosed” system. Habermas, J Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1996) 462. 
40
 Teubner, supra n 24 at 18. 
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„reference‟ inevitably implies external reference as well; that is, a self-
referential system will designate itself “in contrast to its environment” 
through an act of self-observation.41  This difference between external and 
internal reference is a reflection of the distinction between facts and norms 
that is a key element of the legal system within Luhman‟s theory.42   
 
Self-observation refers to a system‟s capacity to influence its own 
operations.  Within the legal system, Teubner describes legal doctrine as 
an example of self-observation.43   However, self-observations do not in 
themselves produce valid law but simply describe legal operations and 
their structures.44  A legal system moves beyond mere self-observation 
and engages in self-organisation when it uses what H.L.A Hart referred to 
as „secondary rules‟ to produce „primary rules‟.45 This process of self-
organisation ultimately develops into self-regulation allowing the legal 
system to not only produce new „primary‟ rules but also to alter its own 
structure in accordance with its own systemic criteria.46   
 
The most complex concept within the definition of autopoiesis is the 
concept of self-production.  Teubner notes that the term does not imply 
“that all causes are located within the system”,47 as a self-producing legal 
system is strongly influenced by external factors including social, political 
and economic events.48  What distinguishes a self-producing system from 
other social systems is the fact that a self-producing system “reproduces 
itself by extracting and constituting, as it were, new elements from the flow 
of events, which it then uses by linking them up selectively.”49 Teubner 
describes the legal system as a „second-order‟ autopoietic system that 
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developed from society, which he considers to be the „first-order‟ social 
system, through a historical process of self-production.50 
 
Autopoiesis consists of a particular combination of these processes.  It 
involves the self-production of all components within a system, self-
maintenance of this self-production through self-productive cycles, and 
self-regulation of the entire process.51  Teubner argues that modern legal 
systems exhibit these features as “legal communications generate 
themselves through the network of legal expectations, and are regulated 
by legal dogmatics and legal process.”52  The effect of this autopoietic 
process is that the legal system generates norms autonomously from 
other social systems53 and maintains its own stability through these 
internal autopoietic processes.54 Although elements may be extracted from 
other systems, the legal system maintains its autonomy from those 
systems by strictly controlling the extraction process for its own purposes.  
 
The role of human beings in these processes is one of the more 
controversial aspects of Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s systems theories.  An 
obvious critique of their theories is that symbolic systems such as legal 
systems cannot generate themselves, as symbols require human 
interpretation.55  Teubner‟s response is that it is not only legal acts that are 
involved in self-productive processes; all of the legal system‟s 
components, including its structures, processes, boundaries, identities, 
functions and performances, are also involved in the processes of self-
production.56  Consequently, Teubner argues, human beings have a 
double role as they “function as semantic constructs of the legal system 
and as independent autopoietic (psychic) systems in the environment of 
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law”.57 Teubner‟s theory therefore views human beings as semantically 
constructed objects or, to use Luhman‟s term, “semantic artefacts.”58 
 
2.5 What are „semantic artefacts‟? 
 
One critique of Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s arguments concerning the law‟s 
inability to communicate directly with other social systems, is that the law 
and other social systems all share a common medium: the human beings 
who exist within and across the different systems that make up society as 
a whole. However, Luhman argues that the legal system, due to the 
effects of autopoiesis, does not deal with „flesh-and-blood people‟ but with 
„semantic artefacts‟ constructed by the legal system itself.59  
Consequently, the law is unable to respond to, and communicate with, the 
subjective experiences of human beings who engage with the legal 
system and can only engage with the „semantic artefacts‟ constructed by 
the legal system itself.  Although the law constructs all human beings as 
semantic artefacts, this thesis will focus on how the law constructs children 
in this objectifying way.  
  
When constructing children as semantic artefacts to which it can apply its 
norms, the law generates binary alternatives that define what falls within 
and what falls outside particular semantic categories.  These alternatives 
include whether particular conduct is defined as legal or illegal or whether 
a particular human being is defined as an adult or a child. The generation 
of binary alternatives is a functional requirement of the legal system as it 
allows the law to reduce human complexity into a form that allows the law 
to exercise its decision making power and reflects the legal system‟s 
foundation on the dichotomy between legal and illegal.60   
 
Western thought often relies on establishing binary alternatives.61 
Margaret Davies criticises this habit within legal processes on the basis 
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that it “mediates oppression by defining and legitimising the categories of 
sameness and deviancy.”62  This critique can be applied to Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s systems theories.  Both Luhman and Teubner argue that the 
legal system operates on the basis of the foundational dichotomy between 
legal and illegal.  However, they do not question this foundation and 
consequently fail to consider the impact of power differentials within 
society and any oppression arising from the legal categorisation process is 
thereby masked. The law in Western society has traditionally operated by 
reference to adult, white, male Europeans as the subjects of the legal 
system63 and consequently it has been the needs and interests of this 
group of subjects that have provided the norms with which other human 
beings have been compared.  Theorists such as Derrida have challenged 
these traditional norms and have called for a reconsideration of “the 
boundaries that institute the human subject” within the legal system.64  
 
The law‟s need to construct „semantic artefacts‟ operates throughout the 
legal system.  It operates not only in the formal setting of a Court 
proceeding, but begins when individuals begin interacting with the legal 
system.  As noted by Sarat and Felstine: 
 
Clients often seek to expand the conversational agenda to encompass a 
broader picture of their lives, experiences and needs.  In so doing, they 
contest the ideology of separate spheres that lawyers seek to maintain.  
Lawyers, on the other hand, passively resist such expansion.65 
 
Lawyers resist such expansion because they need to construct their 
clients as semantic artefacts to which the legal system can respond by 
employing the limited binary alternatives available within legal discourse.  
These binary alternatives do not necessarily reflect wider social realities, 
or even the views of legal professionals operating the system.  Rather, as 
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Teubner argues, legal reality, including its understanding of human beings, 
is constructed through the specific limitations of legal communication.66  
 
Constructing human beings as semantic artefacts therefore prevents the 
law from interacting directly with individual human beings. By mediating its 
interactions with human subjects through semantic constructions, the law 
engages with those semantic constructions rather than with human beings 
directly.  This is the basis of Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s argument that the 
law cannot function as an institution for solving social problems.  They 
claim that the law‟s inability to resolve social problems does not arise from   
 
 the obvious reasons that judges may be class-bound, gender-bound and 
race-bound in their interpretation of these problems, but because the law, 
having developed its own „rationality‟ in order to decide social conflicts, 
then goes on to abstract highly selective models of the world thereby 
neglecting many politically, economically and socially relevant elements.67  
 
Luhman and Teubner describe the law‟s process of abstracting a selective 
model of the world as operative closure. 
 
2.6 What is operative closure? 
 
If the legal system operates autopoietically, legal communications become 
differentiated from general social communications and the meaning that 
the legal system gives to such communications will have no direct 
relationship to the meanings such communications may have in other 
social discourses.  In short, meaning within the legal system becomes 
„closed‟ to the outside world.68  Constructing human beings as semantic 
artefacts is but one example of this closure.  Autopoietic theory 
„radicalises‟ this closure by claiming that it prevents closed systems such 
as the law from intervening in other systems such as society.69   
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Luhman accepts that this „operative closure‟ is counterintuitive, particularly 
for systems that appear to be closely related such as the legal and political 
systems.70  However, Luhman argues that closure is not isolation71 and 
that: 
 
 [S]ystems theory has long since accepted that openness (dependence of 
the system on its environment) on the basis of matter or energy does not 
conflict with the thesis of informational or semantic closure.72 
 
Luhman therefore argues that, although the legal system can be materially 
related to its environment (through the provision of funding for example), 
the way in which the legal system understands, explains and structures 
itself in response to its environment is internally generated by the system 
itself. Luhman and Teubner argue that it is this closure of understanding 
that prevents the law from dealing directly with „the outside world‟ and 
reforming society.73 
 
Systems theories originally encouraged political strategies of reform by 
describing systems as means of direct social intervention analogous to 
other forms of social intervention such as money, power and technology.74  
Teubner argues that autopoietic theory, with its concept of closed 
systems, began to be applied to the legal system when theorists came to 
the view that social intervention by the legal system had “unexpected” 
results.75 Although Teubner does not offer any examples of these 
“unexpected results”, he claims that autopoietic theory explains such 
results by establishing that intervention is not actually possible given 
systemic closure and that what are perceived to be the results of 
intervention are, in fact, coincidences.76 
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The operative closure of the legal system operates in two ways.  First, 
once the legal system has become autonomous, it cannot directly receive 
communications from other social systems.  Secondly, a closed legal 
system cannot directly influence or send communications to other „outside‟ 
systems.  
 
Luhman and Teubner argue that communications received by a closed 
legal system can only influence the legal system indirectly through a 
process of reconstruction whereby the legal system „translates‟ the 
external communication into a legally valid form.77  This „translation‟ 
involves more than merely translating general social communications into 
legal jargon; the process involves a radical reconstruction of social events 
as legal events occurring within the legal system.78 In the process, 
disputes are reconstructed from conflicts occurring in the social sphere to 
autonomous legal conflicts within the legal system.79  
 
One example of the legal system‟s inability to receive communications 
directly from other discursive systems without translation is that complex 
research results from the social sciences concerning the welfare of 
children are simplified and converted into legally valid normative 
principles.80 This process of translation is required to simplify complex 
research into a format capable of defining a particular event as either legal 
or illegal; facts need to be translated into norms.  Consequently, the legal 
system can be slow to react to advances in knowledge from other fields of 
enquiry. This is confirmed by recent research which shows that new social 
science research is regularly omitted from Court ordered psychological 
assessments and is seldom referred to by legal counsel or in legal 
judgments.81 Furthermore, when scientific research is presented in a legal 
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setting, it can lose its “essential elements of scientific quality” as a 
consequence of the translation processes involved.82  
 
The distinction between facts and norms leads to the second effect of 
operative closure; the law cannot directly regulate with the world „outside‟ 
the legal system itself because it is unable to communicate with it.83  The 
law can only reconstruct the outside world in forms that are acceptable as 
legal communications within the legal system itself and this restricts the 
law‟s ability to act as a tool of social regulation.84  
 
2.7 Can the law regulate society? 
 
Luhman and Teubner therefore raise significant doubts about the legal 
system‟s ability to regulate society. They claim that because of the legal 
system‟s operative closure and the way in which it constructs highly 
abstract models of the world, the legal system is limited in its ability to 
send or receive communications to other social systems and is 
consequently unable to regulate society. Although their theories initially 
appear somewhat counterintuitive, it cannot be denied that the law is not 
universally complied with.  At best, it therefore appears that the law‟s 
ability to regulate society is limited in some way and Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s theories offer a coherent and thorough explanation for the 
failure of legal regulation.  However, their theories are not the only theories 
that attempt to explain this phenomenon. 
 
Teubner identifies a number of ways in which other theorists have 
explained or responded to the common failure of legal regulation to secure 
universal conformity to legal norms. He describes one response, the 
generation of more legal norms to forbid disobedience, as „the lawyer‟s 
response‟.85  In contrast, the sociological response is to apply models of 
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efficacy to propose more severe sanctions for non-compliance.86  Another 
response is to view non-conformity as a regulatory failure resulting from a 
lack of appropriate power that can only be overcome by strengthening the 
power sources of regulatory agencies.87   Yet another approach is to 
identify mismatches of regulatory responses to particular social structures 
(such as the misuse of command and control norms to deal with issues of 
economic utility).88  
 
An examination of these alternative approaches is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  However, for the purposes of this thesis, it must be noted that 
Teubner argues that these alternative approaches are attempts to 
overcome systemic autonomy, rather than valid descriptions of how the 
legal system operates.89  Luhman and Teubner discard all of these 
alternative approaches and Luhman argues that the autonomy of the law 
as a closed autopoietic system is inescapable and cannot be overcome.  If 
this is correct, the law cannot regulate society.  However, Teubner offers 
some hope for legal regulation by claiming that legal intervention in other 
social systems is possible, if only indirectly.90 Teubner argues that the 
legal system can indirectly affect other social systems through processes 
of reciprocal observation and interference.91  
 
Teubner‟s theory of interference through reciprocal observation is 
dependent upon a particular and somewhat counterintuitive definition of 
observation.  Teubner points to a price freeze as an event which is 
generally considered to be a direct legal intervention by the legal system in 
society but, within Teubner‟s theory, is an example of an “act of 
observation”.92  According to Teubner, what actually occurs when a price 
freeze is introduced is that the legal system imagines that the economic 
system functions in a particular way and then, on the basis of that 
imaginative construction, it uses a price control to observe its own 
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operations.93  The observation involves the introduction of a legally 
relevant binary distinction that the legal system uses on the basis of its 
verification procedures to determine the existence of legally relevant 
facts.94   
 
Teubner argues that observation processes generate opportunities for 
different social systems to interfere with each other.  Such interference 
can occur when different social systems „observe‟ the same 
communicative event.95  This interference arises because all social 
systems are ultimately systems of „meaning‟; they are all based on 
communication to generate „meaning‟ and general social communication 
forms the basis for the specialised communications used within each 
autonomous system.96  This does not mean, however, that information is 
communicated directly between the different systems.  Information is 
generated anew within each system.  The key point is that this information 
is generated simultaneously within each system in relation to the same 
observed event, even though it is observed from a different systemic 
perspective.97  Independent systems within society can therefore indirectly 
influence other systems by creating interference through events that those 
other systems are also observing and responding to. Consequently, 
Teubner argues that the law‟s attempts to regulate society need to move 
beyond traditional cause and effect processes “towards a logic of 
perturbation.”98  
 
Although Teubner argues for the possibility of „interference‟, he accepts 
that the legal system faces significant restrictions in its ability to „interfere‟ 
with other systems.  One such restriction is the problem of maintaining a 
source of motivation through the interference process.  Teubner argues 
that legal communications can only reliably motivate other legal 
communications; their capacity to motivate general social communication 
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is limited because they can only communicate indirectly.99  Consequently 
when the legal system interferes in other social systems, the motivating 
force attaching to the relevant communication within the legal system is 
lost, or at least reduced, through the process of interference.  The source 
of motivation therefore needs to be reinforced within the new system 
through other means of communication. Teubner claims that this 
motivation may be reinforced by moral pressure or claims to normative 
validity but will predominantly be developed through the power of enforced 
sanctions.100 
 
Habermas has criticised Teubner‟s arguments for the possibility of 
„interference‟ between systems on the basis that it is inconsistent with the 
conceptual framework of autopoietic theory.  He notes that:  
 
 On the one hand, legal discourse is supposed to be trapped in its self-
reproduction, constructing only its own internal image of the external 
world; on the other hand, it is supposed to use “general social 
communication” so that it can “influence” general social constructions of 
reality, and in this way influence those of other discursive worlds as well.  
It is difficult to reconcile these two statements.101 
 
Teubner attempts to overcome this criticism by distinguishing between 
social systems that use the same elements (thoughts and 
communications) from systems that use different elements (such as a 
psychic system and a social system).102 However, it is not clear how this 
distinction can overcome operative closure or allow for interference.  On 
that basis, Luhman‟s theory of autopoiesis rejects the possibility of 
interference between systems altogether. 
 
In summary, although Luhman argues that the autopoietically closed 
nature of the legal system prevents it from exercising any degree of 
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regulatory control over other social systems, Teubner argues that some 
indirect regulation is possible.  According to Teubner, indirect regulation 
can occur through the „general shared communications‟ of the legal 
system and other social systems that allow the legal system to „interfere‟ 
with other systems.  Interference is possible where different systems 
„observe‟ the same event; by influencing the observed event, systems can 
indirectly interfere with the observations of other systems thereby 
influencing those systems‟ internal mechanisms.  However, Teubner 
emphasises that the possibility for legal regulation to occur through 
interference is limited and that the fundamentally closed nature of 
autopoietic systems, including the law, is impossible to break down.103 
 
2.8 Why does the law operate as a closed system? 
 
In this section, I will argue that the law operates as a closed system 
because of the requirements of power that proscribe law‟s functional 
requirements. To do so I will apply Derrida‟s theories of law and justice, 
which identify and analyse the logico-formal paradoxes of the legal 
system‟s discursive practices.104 
 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories attempt to describe the operations of the 
legal system and how those operations result in closure of the system.  
They do not consider in detail the reasons why the legal system operates 
in a closed way.  Their theories are primarily descriptive.  However, the 
role of social power in shaping social systems such as the law becomes 
apparent by considering Derrida‟s theories of law and justice.105 
 
Derrida‟s approach to justice and law differs from the traditional „positivist‟ 
approach (including the approach of theorists such as Luhman and 
Teubner) as it questions the foundations of the social or linguistic 
constructs that form part of the legal system.  Positivist approaches 
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„naturalise‟ and mask the underlying power dynamics that shape the legal 
system by failing to question the role of power.106  
 
As previously considered, Luhman and Teubner argue that the law 
operates as a closed system through the process of autopoiesis and they 
do not examine whether law has any source of validity beyond itself.  By 
restricting their theories to describing the operations of the law and 
excluding any consideration of issues of morality or justice, issues of 
validity lose their importance.  
 
In contrast, Derrida focuses on the source of law‟s validity and argues that 
the law validates its existence through the use of force.107 For Derrida, 
„force‟ refers to power differentials within society.  In fact, it is differences 
in power which create differences in society; for Derrida, „difference‟ 
means „difference of force.‟108  Power is therefore related to the law 
through the concept of enforceability.  According to Derrida, the concept of 
enforceability is “essentially implied in the very concept of justice as 
law.”109 Consequently, force (which Derrida also describes as „power‟ or 
„violence‟110) has a complex internal relationship with law; law is not simply 
a tool used by those with power but is inextricably linked to the validity of 
the law.111   
 
As previously noted,112 Teubner recognised that the basic legal/illegal 
dichotomy underlying the legal system is a fundamental paradox.  
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s systems theories are attempts to address this 
paradox by adapting theories of autopoiesis from the biological sciences.  
In contrast, Derrida acknowledges the paradox and argues that it is 
inescapable as the founding authority for the law cannot be law but the 
violence “without ground” that establishes the legal system.113 For Derrida, 
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any legal system is “neither legal nor illegal in the founding moment”.114  
Consequently, the existence of any legal system does not depend on the 
system itself, even through a process of autopoietic self-production as 
Luhman and Teubner argue, but ultimately rests on an expression of force 
that is neither legal nor illegal.  Derrida refers to this as the “mystical 
foundation” of law‟s authority.115  Given these internal relationships 
between force, enforceability and law, Derrida argues that the law can be 
critiqued to uncover the “economic and political interests of the dominant 
forces of society.”116   
 
In addition to identifying the “mystical foundation” of law‟s authority, 
Derrida identifies three logical contradictions that are a fundamental and 
inescapable part of the legal system.  The first is the contradiction 
between the need for freedom in decision-making and the simultaneous 
need for decisions to be predictable applications of known rules.  In other 
words, for decisions to be just, they must be both regulated and 
unregulated.117  The second is the need to recognise particularity and the 
corresponding need for general equity.118  The third contradiction Derrida 
identified is that ultimately, given the limitations of human understanding 
and the fact that decisions are always made on the basis of incomplete 
knowledge, all decisions are “a madness” in the sense that they are a 
reflection of both rational and irrational processes.119 
 
Derrida claims that all of these contradictions operate within Western legal 
systems and that their existence, and their inevitability, justifies his 
argument that the law‟s authority ultimately rests on violence and force.  
The existence of these contradictions prevents the legal system from 
claiming that its decisions and authority are founded on logic and reason. 
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Derrida‟s exploration of the relationship between law and force is 
significant when considering the law‟s ability to protect children from 
maltreatment.  If, as Derrida argues, the validity of law is ultimately based 
on an expression of force, either through systemic power, physical force or 
any other form of socially recognised, and thereby privileged, difference, 
those within society who have no or little power to enforce their interests 
are at a significant systemic disadvantage.  This disadvantage is 
entrenched given the operative closure of the legal system.  The functional 
requirements of the legal system that lead to operative closure through 
autopoiesis, are requirements with a “mystical foundation” in social power.  
Those without power are thereby excluded from the operations of power 
within the system. 
 
Clearly, children within New Zealand society have little or no power 
themselves; they are dependent upon those with power to take action on 
their behalf.120  Although the law can promise to protect children, its ability 
to do so is limited given the legal system‟s operative closure based on 
functional requirements that serve the interests of power. To recognise 
this issue, laws relating to children need to be carefully analysed and 
deconstructed to determine whether they reflect the needs and wishes of 
children themselves or, in fact, the needs and wishes of other groups 
within society who have the power to enforce their own interests.   
 
2.9 Summary 
 
Luhman and Teubner argue that the law creates its own abstract world of 
meaning and is consequently closed and distinct from what many people 
think of as the „real world‟.  This operative closure arises from systemic 
processes of knowledge and meaning creation.  The legal system 
produces knowledge that meets its own functional requirements.  These 
requirements include a requirement for the law to reduce the chaotic 
complexity of subjective human reality to binary alternatives, such as the 
stark dichotomy between legal and illegal.  This reduction results in the 
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law responding to its own created world, an abstracted, simplified world 
populated with semantic artefacts, rather than the subjectively 
experienced worlds of those subject to the law‟s operations.  By 
constructing its own world in this way, the law engages in an exercise of 
power by constructing differences between adults and children.121 
 
If Luhman and Teubner are correct, their theories may offer an explanation 
for some of the difficulties the law faces in protecting children from 
maltreatment.  In chapters four to seven I will therefore examine how the 
law operates in more detail to determine whether Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s 
theories offer an accurate description of the law in practice.  However, 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claim that the world of the law is operationally 
closed from society is controversial and criticised by other theorists, 
particularly by Jurgen Habermas.  Before examining how the law operates, 
I will therefore examine Habermas‟ alternative theory for explaining the 
relationship between law and society. 
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Chapter 3  Habermas: Law and Society 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will examine Habermas‟ response to Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s theories.  As examined in chapter two, Luhman and Teubner 
claim that the law is a closed, autopoietic system and is consequently 
unable to communicate with, influence or regulate, other social systems.  
In contrast, Habermas uses his theory of communicative action to critique 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims and argue that the law is, in fact, able to 
influence and ultimately regulate society. For Habermas, the law‟s ability 
to regulate society is dependent upon those subject to the law perceiving 
the law to be valid.  As indicated in chapter two, Derrida found the source 
of validity in an original exercise of force.122  In contrast, Habermas locates 
the source of legal validity in social processes of deliberative democracy.   
 
Habermas‟ theory is useful when considering the law‟s response to child 
maltreatment as he argues that the law is able to play a role in regulating 
society.  Habermas therefore provides a theoretical basis for critiquing 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s pessimism and examining some of the 
prerequisites for effective regulation.  
 
Habermas agrees with Luhman and Teubner that the law‟s role in modern 
Western society is to play a part in maintaining social integration by 
stabilising divergent behavioural expectations.123 However, he argues that 
the law achieves this by generating mutual understanding between 
communicatively acting subjects who accept particular validity claims.124 
Social values, norms and systemic factors such as economic markets and 
the administrative use of power also play a role in integrating society.125  
However, Habermas argues, the law‟s ability to play its part in maintaining 
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social integration has become increasingly difficult within modern, 
differentiated societies. Understanding Habermas‟ concept of modern 
society is therefore an important step in understanding his legal theory.   
 
3.2 How does Habermas describe modern society? 
 
For Habermas, modern Western societies are complex and face 
increasing social differentiation:  that is, the role of individuals within 
modern society is no longer explicitly determined by birth, class or other 
external, fixed characteristics.126 Within modern Western societies, 
individuals may have many different functionally specified tasks, social 
roles and interest positions.127  
 
Concomitant with increasing social differentiation has been an increasing 
pluralisation of what Habermas refers to as subjective „lifeworlds‟.128 
„Lifeworld‟ is a sociological term referring to shared subjective conceptions 
of reality bound to the medium of ordinary language and reflecting cultural 
traditions, social expectations and individual competencies.129  A 
significant result of this lifeworld pluralisation has been a corresponding 
reduction in shared metaphysical beliefs.  Habermas argues that, because 
of increasing social differentiation and lifeworld pluralisation, legal theory 
within modern Western society needs to allow for and incorporate a wide 
range of subjective perceptions of reality. 
 
Habermas‟ attempt to incorporate subjective perceptions into his theory of 
the law is in stark contrast to Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s approach to 
subjectivity. Both Luhman and Teubner focus on an objective and abstract 
description of law and society.  They ignore the perspectives of 
participants within systems. In contrast, Habermas attempts to balance 
both the normative, objective aspects of law and the perspectives of 
participants.  Habermas refers to this relationship between the normative 
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and subjective aspects of law as a tension between “facticity and validity” 
and this description emphasises the importance, for Habermas, of the 
concept of legal validity.130  
 
3.3 What is the source of the law‟s validity? 
 
Habermas argues that in pre-modern Western societies, that is, in 
undifferentiated societies with few available lifeworlds, the law established 
its validity on the metaphysical grounds of higher-ranking and widely 
accepted moral law such as the God-given authority of the King or the 
Church.131  However, given the pluralisation of modern societies and their 
subjective „lifeworlds‟, such appeals to metaphysical grounds of authority 
are no longer universally accepted by those subject to the law.132 As a 
result, modern law has had to find alternative sources of validity.133   
 
Habermas argues that the challenge for the law within modern Western 
societies is locating a source of validity outside the metaphysical grounds 
of shared religious belief or universal lifeworlds. Luhman and Teubner 
avoid addressing this challenge by focusing exclusively on an objective 
analysis of the source of legal legitimacy within the legal system itself.  By 
closing the legal system off from the subjective perceptions of its subjects, 
Luhman and Teubner avoid considering subjective perceptions of the 
law‟s validity.  In contrast, the internal, subjective perception of validity for 
legal subjects is an important issue for Habermas.  He argues that rational 
discourse and democratic processes are the source of this subjectively 
perceived validity within modern, post-metaphysical societies. 
 
Habermas argues that the law needs to maintain validity (both objective 
and subjective) if it is to achieve its social function of maintaining social 
integration.  If the law is not perceived by its subjects to be valid, other 
factors such as intimidation, force, custom or mere habit are required to 
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ensure compliance with the law‟s normative requirements.134  Whereas 
Derrida argues that „force‟ or „violence‟ is the ultimate and “mystical” 
source of law‟s validity,135 Habermas argues that force only operates in the 
absence of subjectively perceived validity arising from discursively 
generated understanding.   
 
To explain the significance of this discursively generated understanding, 
Habermas distinguishes between legal subjects taking strategic and 
performative approaches to complying with the law.  Legal subjects take a 
strategic approach when they comply with the law on the basis of their 
calculation of the consequences of non-compliance but take a 
performative approach when they comply because they view the norm 
established by the law as valid.136   
 
For Derrida, all legal compliance is ultimately strategic.  For Luhman and 
Teubner, the subjective perceptions of legal subjects is an issue outside 
their conceptual framework and therefore irrelevant.  However, for 
Habermas, understanding the distinction between performative and 
strategic compliance provides useful insights into the operation of modern, 
Western legal systems.  He argues that although strategic compliance 
may be acceptable on occasion, the validity of the legal system, and 
ultimately its ability to perform its socially integrative function, is dependent 
upon achieving and maintaining performative compliance. It is therefore 
clear that, for Habermas, the discursive process of reaching 
„understanding‟ is an important part of the law‟s operation within modern 
Western societies.  Habermas argues that this „understanding‟ arises from 
what he describes as „communicative action‟137.    
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3.4 What is „communicative action‟? 
 
Habermas criticises modern philosophical theories that discard the 
concept of reason as a universal concept and he attempts to resurrect it 
by locating reason within interpersonal communication.138  For Habermas, 
„communicative action‟ is the process that produces rational knowledge 
about the world.139  This rational knowledge then forms the basis of law‟s 
validity. 
 
Habermas claims that „communicative action‟ occurs when competent 
speakers raise universal validity claims and then participate in processes 
of debate about those claims.140 During such debates, proponents of truth 
claims need to defend their claims with reasons141 and when truth claims 
obtain the rationally motivated agreement of the interpretation community 
as a whole, the claims can be considered rationally valid.142 This process 
transports the concepts of reason and truth from an abstract realm into a 
linguistic medium.143  Consequently, reason and truth lose any relationship 
with idealised contents in a Platonic sense and become grounded in the 
shared understandings of social groups.144  The potential for „shared 
understanding‟ is therefore an important element of Habermas‟ theory. 
 
Developing a „shared understanding‟ requires communicative actors within 
a community to commit themselves to pragmatic presuppositions,145 
including the assumption that members of the community can understand 
the meaning of grammatical expressions in identical ways.146  This is a 
controversial assumption.  Derrida, for example, argues that the belief that 
all members of a linguistic community share the same idiom is an ideal 
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that is “never possible”147 Although Habermas does not specifically 
acknowledge this issue, his approach is designed to develop a “pragmatic 
explanation of the idea of truth”148 rather than identify universal ideals.   
 
Habermas‟ theory of „communicative action‟ therefore establishes a 
general theory of the pragmatic development of truth or validity claims 
within modern societies through reasoned communication.  By applying 
this general theory to the law, Habermas argues that the rule of law is 
conceptually related to the practice of deliberative democracy.149 In fact, 
for Habermas, the democratic process bears “the entire burden” of 
legitimising legal norms.150  
 
3.5 Why is democracy important? 
 
Habermas centres his account of legal legitimacy on the principle that: 
 
 Only those norms are valid to which all affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses.151 
 
This principle, which Habermas refers to as the „discourse principle‟, 
explains the importance of democratic processes within Habermas‟ social 
theory; democratic processes allow people subject to the law to participate 
in its creation.  Habermas argues that the subjective perception that the 
law is the creation of rational processes and therefore rational is the basis 
of the law‟s validity.  
 
Habermas argues that democratic processes bear the burden of 
generating validity because, without religious or metaphysical grounds for 
validity, the law can only perform its function of integrating and regulating 
society if those subject to the law are able to consider themselves to be 
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the “rational authors” of the law they are subject to and that the law is 
therefore valid.152  Democratic processes are therefore designed to ensure 
that those subject to the law are given an opportunity to contribute to the 
law-making process through communicative action.  Habermas argues 
that, within modern society, it is this principle of democratic participation 
that “confers legitimating force on the legislative process”.153  
 
The principle of democratic participation creates a distinction between 
those who are able to participate in the democratic processes of law‟s 
creation and those who are not.  This ability to participate, within modern 
Western societies, is generally dependent on legal rights.  Habermas 
argues that the legitimacy of the legal process is therefore dependent 
upon protecting the rights of those subject to the law to participate in the 
processes of law‟s creation.154 This point has significant implications for 
children, who are often given little or no rights to participate in democratic 
processes. 
 
Habermas‟ approach to human rights differs from the approaches of 
traditional liberal legal theorists such as Locke for whom legal rights were 
a necessary protection against the power of the state.155 Modern rights 
theorists such as Dworkin have adopted a similar approach, arguing that 
rights distinguish law from “ordered brutality” and therefore operate as a 
restraint on state power.156  As Habermas notes, under such theories, 
concepts of human rights and state power are in competition.157  
Habermas argues that this approach fails to take into account the 
“constitutive connection between law and politics”,158 that is, the fact that 
the rights of individuals and the validity of public democratic processes are 
each dependent upon the other.159  
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3.6 Summary 
 
Luhman and Teubner offer a pessimistic vision of the law‟s ability to 
regulate society. In this chapter I have examined the theories of 
Habermas, a prominent critic of Luhman and Teubner, in an effort to 
discount their theories.  
 
Habermas argues that knowledge is created through a process he 
describes as „communicative action‟, not through the autopoietic, closed 
processes Luhman and Teubner propose. He argues that the law uses 
communicative action to create rational knowledge about the world and 
establish its validity and that this requires the active participation of those 
subject to the law.  Consequently, Habermas argues that the law is not 
operationally closed but created through the participatory processes of 
modern democracy.  Law and society therefore have a symbiotic 
relationship and the law is able to regulate society (just as society is able 
to regulate the law).  
 
A key distinction between Habermas and Luhman and Teubner is the 
difference in the way they describe the law‟s knowledge creation 
processes.  Habermas locates the source of knowledge in the participatory 
processes of communicative action whereas Luhman and Teubner argue 
that knowledge is produced by the legal system itself, to meet its own 
functional requirements.  This is an important distinction when considering 
what the law can do to protect children from maltreatment because the 
law‟s response to children will inevitably be a consequence of its 
knowledge about children.  In chapter four I will therefore focus on how the 
law produces its knowledge about children.   
 
In chapter four I will argue that Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theory explains 
the way in which the law produces knowledge about children.  I will also 
argue that Habermas‟ theory does not describe the law‟s knowledge 
production process with the same clarity, primarily because it fails to 
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incorporate Foucault‟s insight that “power produces knowledge.”160 I will 
argue that the law is engaged in an exercise of power when it produces its 
knowledge about children and, as a result, the knowledge it produces 
generally serves the needs of the legal system itself not the needs of 
children.  I will argue that this result is predicted by Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s theories as they accept the exclusion of children from the law‟s 
knowledge creation process.  Conversely, because Habermas‟ theory of 
knowledge creation is so dependent upon the ability to participate in 
producing knowledge through democratic processes, it fails to describe 
the way in which the law produces knowledge about children given that 
they cannot participate in those processes directly.   
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Chapter 4    Producing Knowledge 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will argue that the law uses its creative power to produce 
knowledge about children. However, the law‟s functional requirements limit 
the law‟s exercise of creative power so that the knowledge it produces 
differs from the world experienced by children.  The law produces its 
knowledge about children in a number of ways but, given space 
limitations, this chapter will focus on how the law uses conceptions of 
childhood to produce its knowledge about children.161 I will argue that 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories explain how the law uses these 
conceptions to construct children as objects that meet the legal system‟s 
functional requirements. I will also argue that Habermas‟ theory of 
communicative action does not have the same explanatory power as he 
does not account for the role of power in producing knowledge.  
 
4.2 How does power produce knowledge? 
 
The law has traditionally operated on the basis of the „correspondence‟ 
model of language and assumed that language accurately corresponds 
with a discernible, absolute reality.162 As a result, the law has assumed 
that the interpretation of the law and the finding of facts are processes 
involving the discovery of absolute truths.163  This meant that when the law 
was required to respond to the needs of children, the law distinguished 
children from adults simply on the basis of their obvious physical 
limitations.164 The law did not take account of the way in which children 
were described as the law considered that those descriptions 
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corresponded with absolute objective reality.165  However, recent 
philosophical developments have challenged the „correspondence model‟ 
of language and its use within the legal system. 
 
Following the „linguistic turn‟ in philosophy and social theory many social 
theorists now argue that what is generally accepted as „reality‟ does not 
correspond to one absolute reality but is actually a representation 
constructed through social discourse.166 Language can therefore be used 
as a tool by those with power to achieve particular individual or social 
goals, a possibility described by sociologists as the „action orientation‟ 
model of language.167 Power therefore produces knowledge because the 
meaning of language is dependent upon context and the intentions of the 
speaker.168 Recognising the role of power in producing knowledge about 
children leads to a re-evaluation of the ways in which children and 
childhood have been understand by society and the law.   
 
When the law is called upon to respond to the needs of a child, it engages 
in a process of constructing a linguistic representation of that child.  This 
construction arises through the use of discursive techniques of description 
and definition. Using Luhman‟s terminology, the law constructs the child as 
a „semantic artifact‟ to which the legal system can respond.169  To do so, 
the law employs conceptions of childhood, many of which have a long 
history within Western society.  
 
In this chapter I will examine some of the major conceptions of childhood 
that have developed in Western society and the ways in the law uses 
these conceptions to produce knowledge about children and construct 
children as objects that meet the legal system‟s functional requirements.170 
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By exercising its power to produce its knowledge about children to meet its 
own functional requirements, the law separates its knowledge from the 
subjective realities of children themselves and this limits the law‟s ability to 
meet their needs.  This process is driven by the law‟s functional 
requirement to divide reality into binary alternatives amenable to resolution 
through the legal system.  A fundamental binary, when considering the 
law‟s response to children, is the binary distinction between adults and 
children.  This distinction is established and supported by conceptions of 
childhood. 
 
4.3 How do conceptions of childhood divide society? 
 
Any conception of childhood must begin with the idea that children are, in 
some way, different to adults. Aries, for example, defined the concept of 
childhood as: 
 
[A]n awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature 
which distinguishes the child from the adult.171 
 
A focus on the distinction between children and adults can operate to the 
detriment of children by encouraging a focus on what it is that children lack 
in comparison to the socially constructed ideals of adulthood.172  However, 
accepting that children are different from adults does not inevitably lead to 
a view that children are in some way inferior to adults.  Many modern 
writers have acknowledged differences between adults and children while 
affirming that children are autonomous individuals entitled to rights.173  The 
difficulty lies in appropriately balancing respect for children as unique 
human beings while simultaneously acknowledging and allowing for their 
vulnerability and limited knowledge, experience and conceptual skill. 
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The idea that children should be distinguished from adults forms the basis 
of many legal instruments relating to the status and rights of children, 
including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“UNCRC”).174  As noted in the UNCRC‟s preamble: 
 
The child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well 
as after birth.175 
 
Conceptions of childhood give meaning to and thereby offer justifications 
for the binary distinction between adults and children.   
 
4.4 Have conceptions of childhood always existed? 
 
Phillip Aries was one of the first historians to examine the ways in which 
conceptions of childhood have developed over time. He claimed that no 
conception of childhood existed during the Middle Ages.  In this section I 
will examine Aries‟ claims and argue that conceptions of childhood did 
exist during the Middle Ages and that it appears that conceptions of 
childhood have always existed, even if they have changed over time. 
 
Aries developed his theories by interpreting a variety of historical 
documents dating from the Middle Ages through to the late nineteenth 
century.  His sources included diaries, autobiographies and art works from 
the relevant periods and his goal was to examine the historical 
development of the concept of childhood.  In summary, Aries argued that: 
 
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to 
suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised.  The idea of 
childhood is not to be confused with affection for children; it corresponds 
to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular 
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nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. 
In medieval society this awareness was lacking.176 
 
Although Aries claimed that the idea of childhood did not exist in medieval 
society, he acknowledged that medieval texts often described the different 
“ages” of human life (from childhood, through pueritia and adolescence to 
youth, senectitude and old age).177  However, he argued that children 
were not treated differently to adults during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.  To support this argument, Aries referred to paintings from the 
period that showed children mingling with adults in everyday life.  This 
intermingling, Aries claimed, was evidence that there was no social 
distinction between the worlds of adulthood and childhood during this 
period.178  Aries also noted that although children were often portrayed in 
medieval art as part of a scene, they were not portrayed alone in portraits, 
a fact that he interpreted as evidence that childhood was considered an 
“unimportant phase of which there was no need to keep any record.”179  
 
Aries argued that, during the Middle Ages, childhood was considered an 
“unimportant phase” because of the high infant mortality rates experienced 
throughout Western Europe throughout the period.180  The child mortality 
rate in England between 1500 and 1800, for example, varied between 
30% and 50%.181   Aries concluded that adults avoided emotional 
attachment to children given the high likelihood that they would not survive 
beyond childhood.182 Consequently, Aries argued, adults placed little value 
on the lives of children and no conceptions were developed to understand 
them.183  
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There are significant difficulties with Aries‟ claims and his theories have 
been criticised by a number of theorists since they were published in 1962.  
Many historians have argued that, at most, Aries has shown that 
conceptions of childhood during the Middle Ages differed from modern 
conceptions, not that the Middle Ages had no conceptions of childhood at 
all.184   
 
Pollock uses evolutionary theory to critique the substance of Aries‟ claims. 
She argues that it would have been difficult for a society to operate 
successfully if little value was placed on the lives of children and that 
children treated as valueless would probably have developed into 
psychologically unhealthy and antisocial adults.185 There is no evidence 
that this occurred.186   
 
Other historians have claimed that the available evidence suggests that 
adults during the Middle Ages did, in fact, respect and value their children, 
despite the high child mortality rates.187 They have noted that studies of 
modern societies with high child mortality rates have failed to show any 
link between the survival chances of young children and how children are 
valued by their parents and other adults in society.188 Aries‟ assumed link 
between high infant mortality rates and a lack of concern for children 
therefore appears to be unsupportable.   
 
It therefore appears that there is little evidence to suggest that the 
conception that children are different from adults is a recent historical 
development. Although Aries argued that the “discovery” of childhood only 
began in the thirteenth century, other historians argue that adults in the 
Middle Ages did appreciate that children were different to adults and that 
they had an appreciation of the nature of those differences.  They claim 
that it was accepted, even during the Middle Ages, that children pass 
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through certain recognisable developmental stages, that they play and 
require discipline, education and protection.189 
 
Despite the limitations of Aries‟ theories, they have had a profound impact 
on the study of social history and the way in which modern Western 
society understands childhood.  His challenge to orthodoxy has combined 
with subsequent social constructionist theories190 to deconstruct and 
describe a variety of conceptions of childhood used within the law to 
construct linguistic representations of children and childhood. Although 
childhood has always been a physical given, concepts regarding the 
significance of childhood have been variously interpreted in different times 
and different places.191 Exploring these concepts is important for an 
examination of the law‟s response to child maltreatment. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I will examine conceptions constructing 
children as: 
 
1. The objects of parental rights and responsibilities; 
2. In need of physical punishment; 
3. Either innocent or corrupt; and 
4. Rationally incompetent.192 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some historical context for these 
four conceptions of childhood and provide some examples of how the law 
continues to use these conceptions today. Although these conceptions are 
employed across society, not only in the legal system, I will argue that the 
law uses these conceptions in its own way to meet its own functional 
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requirements.  In doing so the law creates its own vision of children, what 
Luhman would describe as „semantic artefacts‟ and then responds to 
those artefacts, rather than to the subjectively perceived needs of children 
themselves. The first conception I will examine is the conception that 
children are the objects of adult rights and responsibilities. 
 
 
4.5 Conception 1:  Children are the objects of adult rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
Conceptualising children as the objects of adult rights and responsibilities 
confirms the power of adults over children. Such conceptions are often 
justified by paternalistic claims that adults „know what is best‟ for children 
(particularly „their own‟ children).  The claims of paternalism have a long 
history and, within Western society, can be traced back at least as far as 
the patriarchal power systems of Roman society.  To understand the role 
of paternalism within modern society it is therefore useful to examine the 
historical development of patriarchy and paternalism. 
 
The Roman concept of paterfamilias provides a clear example of the 
power of patriarchy and the concepts it embodies have continued to 
influence the structure of family relationships in Western society since 
Roman times.193 The paterfamilias concept confirmed the absolute 
authority of the male head of the Roman household over his wife and 
children, who were considered to be objects of property rights, rather than 
human beings with rights of their own.  The authority of the paterfamilias 
originally extended to a „right of life and death‟ over his children, although 
it appears that this right was certainly diluted by the sixth century.194  
Although this dilution removed any legal right for a paterfamilias to kill his 
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children, he retained a significant degree of power over them (and over 
others subject to his control, including his wife and slaves). 
During the period when the paterfamilias had a right to kill children, the 
right was generally exercised through the practice of „exposure‟ of infants 
and appears to have reflected a belief that infants were not regarded as 
having attained full human status until accepted into the family by the 
paterfamilias.195  This confirms again the extent to which the nature of 
childhood is culturally constructed through conceptions, in this case, 
conceptions regarding the commencement of human life.196 
 
During the Middle Ages, patriarchal power consolidated its position within 
European societies by adjusting family structures from the predominantly 
open family structures of earlier periods to a more restricted nuclear family 
structure based on the paterfamilias model of Roman society.197 Aries 
argues that this development of the concept of the nuclear family as a unit, 
distinct, separate and private from the outside world, was more significant 
than the modern development of individualism.  Whereas medieval society 
was a rigid, polymorphous whole, Aries argues that the subsequent 
conceptual construction of the nuclear family led to a disintegration of 
European medieval society into discrete families or “little societies”.198 This 
development reinforced private life at the expense of community values199 
and located the responsibility for children within the private realm of the 
nuclear family.  Following the paterfamilias tradition of Roman society, the 
law recognised men as the „heads‟ of such nuclear families.   
 
These adjustments in the structure of society continued the concentration 
of social power in the hands of men with profound implications for both 
women and children.  Arguably, given the nature of patriarchal structures 
that had existed since Roman times at least, these „adjustments‟ simply 
reflected long-standing patriarchal power structures.  However, it is also 
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clear that the long-standing patriarchal power systems combined with 
developing social customs, laws, state propaganda, moral theology and 
family tradition throughout the Middle Ages to generate specific 
expectations and values governing family relationships.200  In particular, 
these factors confirmed that children should respect and obey the 
authority of their fathers.201  
 
It was not until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that 
children began to gain some freedom from the authority of their fathers.202  
This developing freedom arose simultaneously with the identification of 
children as a special interest group within society with their own 
institutions (schools in particular) and moral codes (reflected in the 
growing exclusion of children from discussions of both sex and death).203  
Stone points to a wide range of evidence supporting this claim including 
the development of children‟s books and games (for entertainment rather 
than educational purposes), a growth in family portraits, fading acts of 
deference and changes in modes of address, all of which occurred during 
the eighteenth century.204 However, although children may have gained 
some freedom during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they 
continued to be conceptualised primarily as the property of their fathers205 
and therefore subject to their fathers‟ control.206   
 
The conception that children were the objects of patriarchal property rights 
had particularly profound implications for illegitimate children throughout 
these historical periods.  Illegitimate children were sometimes abandoned 
by their parents and, as they did not possess any separate rights of their 
own, they were often dealt with harshly by society.207  Furthermore, by 
conceptualising children as the objects of parental (particularly patriarchal) 
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rights and responsibilities, illegitimate children could become the objects of 
punishment for the „sins‟ of their parents.   
Although homes for abandoned illegitimate children began to be 
established during the eighteenth century208 some religious authorities 
criticised such institutions for encouraging immorality and illegitimacy, 
thereby punishing illegitimate children for the „sins‟ of their parents.209 
Consequently, such homes faced a constant struggle for funding. Although 
adoption offered some hope for illegitimate children by providing an 
opportunity for them to become subject to the rights and responsibilities of 
adopting adults, it was generally only older children who were adopted. 
The practice of adopting infants did not develop until the twentieth 
century.210  Without adoption, abandoned illegitimate children were literally 
at the mercy of a society often focused on maintaining general social 
morality rather than protecting individual children. 
 
The treatment of illegitimate children by Western society throughout and 
following the Middle Ages has been used to argue that childhood was not 
considered to be of any inherent value until the twentieth century when 
children began to be valued as individuals, distinct from the social value of 
their parents.211  However, this is a significant argument to base on the 
treatment of illegitimate children given that rates of illegitimacy prior to the 
twentieth century were not significant (for example, only 1% of births in 
New Zealand during 1896 were illegitimate)212 and can be explained on 
grounds other than a lack of concern for children (the effects of poverty or 
religious belief for example).  Furthermore, although the mortality rate for 
illegitimate children may have been significantly higher than the rate for 
legitimate children (twice as high as late as 1922)213 this may also be 
attributable to poverty, rather than a lack of (at least maternal) concern for 
the lives of illegitimate children, particularly given the patriarchal structure 
of society which excluded the mothers of illegitimate children from the 
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wealth of society.  It should also be noted that illegitimacy was only 
considered to be a problem within European society.  Within Maori society, 
the care of illegitimate children carried no social stigma and „illegitimate‟ 
children were considered to be a valuable part of the whanau.214  
 
The European concern with legitimacy constructed children as objects and 
the status of legitimacy was significant for the property rights that were 
protected by such status.  Legitimacy concerns therefore established and 
re-affirmed a conceptual link between children as objects and as a form of 
property, a link explicit under the paterfamilias concepts of Roman society.   
 
One consequence of conceptualising children as property objects was the 
resulting utilitarian focus on the contributions that children could make to 
society.  This utilitarian focus reinforced society‟s structural division 
between adults and children.  Adults could be considered to have 
immediate value as contributors to the well being of society.  In contrast, 
children, as „not-yet-adults‟,215 were conceptualised as investments with 
future potential requiring safeguarding. This conception of childhood, 
accepted by many traditional theorists,216 has been criticised by modern 
commentators who argue that although children may be different from 
adults they need to be recognised as distinctive and special in their own 
right, with unique characteristics, needs and interests and inherent value 
as members of today‟s society, not simply as objects of patriarchal 
property rights.217 
 
The conception that children are the objects of patriarchal rights and 
responsibilities continues to play a part in modern society.  However, it has 
been tempered by the influence of feminism and the growing impact of 
socialist thought and activism in mainstream politics.218  The feminist 
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movement has succeeded to a significant extent in moving the rights and 
responsibilities for children from the father to both parents.  Socialist 
thought has also had an impact by gradually shifting some rights and 
responsibilities for children from the private realm of the nuclear family to 
the state.219  Children are now conceptualised as objects of parental 
responsibility and as objects of state responsibility, although how such 
responsibilities are to be shares remains a matter of considerable debate.  
However, although some patriarchal power has been removed, power 
over the lives of children is still held by adults.  Children continue to be 
conceptualised as the objects of the rights and responsibilities of adults, 
what has changed is the identity of the adults who hold those rights and 
responsibilities.  
 
The law in New Zealand continues to use the conception that children are 
the objects of parental rights and responsibilities when constructing its 
response to the needs of children.  Legislative provisions often refer quite 
explicitly to parental and family rights and responsibilities. The Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, for example, provides that 
one of the objects of the Act is to assist parents, families, whanau, hapu, 
iwi and family groups to discharge their responsibilities to their children.220 
Similarly, the Care of Children Act 2004 provides that a child's parents and 
guardians should have the “primary responsibility” for that child's care, 
development and upbringing.221 These legislative provisions both 
conceptualise children as objects of adult responsibilities. 
 
As noted by the High Court in P v K,222 the conception that children are 
objects of the rights of adults, particularly parents, was reflected in the 
language of the Guardianship Act 1968 in its references to “custody” and 
“access” and in the explicit reference in section 2 of that Act to “the right to 
possession … of the child.”223  Although the references to “custody” and 
“access” have been replaced in the Care of Children Act 2004 (which 
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replaced the Guardianship Act 1968) with references to “residence” and 
“contact” it is not clear that this semantic change avoids conceptualising 
children as objects subject to private adult rights.224  
 
Even if the Care of Children Act 2004 continues to conceptualise children 
as the objects of adult rights and responsibilities, it does move away from 
prioritising the rights of parents over the rights of their children.  Boshier J, 
in BDD v IBG,225 noted that: 
 
 The [Care of Children] Act has an unmistakeable shift towards greater 
rights and input from children.  If that is so there is a corresponding 
diminishing in rights of parents ...226 
 
However, despite attempts to diminish the power of parents over the lives 
over their children, the conception that children are primarily the objects of 
private, family rights and responsibilities continues to play a significant role 
in constructing the law‟s response to the needs of children through 
legislation. This was evident during the recent debates regarding the 
repeal of s 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 with many opponents to the 
proposed law change basing their arguments on appeals to parental rights 
over their children.227 I will consider this issue in more detail in chapter six.  
 
The conception that children are the objects of private adult rights and 
responsibilities not only influences the development of statutory provisions 
but also plays a part in the interpretation and application of the law and in 
constructing the beliefs of legal decision makers.  By conceptualising 
children as objects of the rights and responsibilities of adults, the law is 
able to reduce complexity by establishing a presumption that children 
should continue to have contact with or remain in contact with their 
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families. This conception therefore serves the law‟s functional requirement 
of stabilising behavioural expectations and also serves to entrench the 
power of parents over the lives of „their‟ children.  
 
A recent study of the conceptions of childhood held by New Zealand 
Family Court judges found that most of the judges surveyed believe that 
children need to maintain contact with both parents.228 This belief is 
specifically referred to in cases such as C v D229 where Boshier J held that 
“recognition that contact with both parents is by and large important for 
reasons of familial and psycho-social development is reflected in 
boundless cases.”230 M v M (Child Access)231 effectively established this 
conception as a legal presumption. This presumption was established 
despite the fact that research justifying the importance of continuing 
contact with a non-custodial parent has been described as “ambivalent”.232 
The fact that the presumption has been established, despite this 
ambivalent research, indicates that the law has used the conception that 
children are the objects of parental rights to meet its own functional 
requirements, not in order to meet the best interests of children. By 
employing this presumption, the law is able to stabilise behavioural 
expectations by reducing the complex worlds of children‟s lives to level 
amenable to legal resolution.  This is evident in the way in which the 
presumption emphasises the importance of the biological tie. 
 
The relevance of biological ties was an important issue in Re I T A,233 a 
case involving care and protection proceedings for an 8-month-old baby.  
Medical specialists with 30 years‟ experience of child abuse advised that 
the baby faced a risk of death or further severe injury if he was returned to 
his family without appropriate state intervention.  Despite this expert 
opinion the social worker, together with a public health nurse and a Maori 
community health worker supported returning the child to his parents once 
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the parents had partially completed a programme arranged by the Maori 
community health worker. Judge Green expressed serious concern about 
the social worker's apparent inability to grasp and act upon the medical 
specialist‟s advice and took the view that the social worker was focused on 
leaving the child with his parents in order to preserve the biological family 
group rather than on the need to ensure that the child was safe. 
 
Similar issues arose in Re P,234 a case involving a guardianship 
application by a foster mother attempting to prevent the return of a three-
year-old child to her birth mother.  The child was removed from the birth 
mother‟s care shortly after birth given safety concerns due to the birth 
mother‟s depression and young age (19).  By the time the birth mother 
applied for guardianship she had undertaken a number of parenting 
courses, all with the intention of recovering guardianship and custody of 
her child.  
 
The psychotherapist who gave evidence for the birth mother argued that 
the birth mother‟s parenting was “good enough”235 and that, given this 
assessment and the legislative framework, the legal system was obliged to 
plan for the child‟s return to her biological mother.236  He specifically 
referred to the legal requirements of the Children, Young Persons and 
Their Families Act 1989 and the UNCRC to support his arguments.237  By 
specifically referring to the legislative framework, the psychotherapist was 
able to translate his communications regarding the child into a legal valid 
form. 
 
In contrast, the Court appointed psychologist argued that the best interests 
of the child required a focus on continuity of relationships, certainty of 
quality care, predictability, behavioural expectations and routines.238  On 
that basis, she argued that the existing care arrangements should 
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continue and that this would be in the child‟s best interests.  She did not 
refer to the legislative regime at all. 
 
The Court was therefore required to absorb and translate into the legal 
system two conflicting communications from social science experts.  The 
Court ultimately accepted the recommendation of the psychotherapist that 
the child should be returned to the birth mother.   In reaching this decision 
the Court emphasized the importance of the biological tie established by 
the legislative framework, although acknowledging that the primary 
consideration must be the best interests of the child.  The Court referred 
specifically to the dictum of Tipping J in B (CA204/97) v DSW239 that: 
 
 Ordinarily the interests and welfare of children are best served by their 
being in the custody of their biological parents, or at least one of them; 
that is to do no more than state the obvious and to recognize the 
fundamental role of the biological family in our society.240 
 
Once the importance of the biological tie was thus established the Court 
was led to focus on the efforts of the mother.  The Court found that: 
 
 The birth mother has had the goal of having the child returned to her 
firmly in her sights for a considerable period of time and has done 
everything which she could reasonably be expected to have done to 
prepare herself adequately for the return of the child.241 
 
The decision in Re P is significant for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it is 
significant to note the extent to which legal norms structured the 
communications of at least one of the social scientists called to give 
evidence at the hearing.  The Court appointed psychologist focused on the 
child‟s best interests without reference to the legal framework.  In contrast, 
the birth mother‟s expert successfully translated his communications into a 
form acceptable to the legal system through a process of self-reference; 
his communications became valid legal communications because they 
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included reference to other legal communications such as the provisions 
of the relevant legislation and international law. 
 
The cases of Re I T A and Re P both illustrate how the law continues to be 
structured by the conception that children are the objects of adult 
responsibilities and that, because the biological tie is so important, those 
adult responsibilities and rights reside in parents. By employing these 
conceptions, the law is able to reduce the complex worlds of children‟s 
lives to a more manageable level.  This is also evident in the way in which 
these conceptions contribute to the way in which the law constructs and 
interprets the views of children. 
 
By conceptualising children as the objects of parental or biological family 
rights and responsibilities and presuming that contact should be 
maintained the law is able to discount the subjective experiences of 
children.  This is not only a failure to give children the respect they 
deserve as human beings but reduces the law‟s ability to understand and 
thereby fully meet the needs of children in the context of their own lives.  
This was evident in H v F,242 a case involving an application by parents for 
custody of their children and the removal of the children from their 
grandparents. 
 
The parents in H v F had previously left their two children in the care of the 
grandparents and they sought the return of the children through the legal 
system. The case was particularly challenging because the children, 
during their time with their grandparents, had accepted their grandparents‟ 
religious beliefs and did not want to return to the custody of their apostate 
parents.  
 
Justice Fraser noted that the parents “ought to have acted at once to get 
the children back”,243 clearly constructing the case as an adult conflict over 
property objects.  This construction of the dispute as a conflict analogous 
with a property dispute enabled the Court to employ concepts of parental 
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rights to resolve the dispute. By conceptualizing the children as the objects 
of parental rights, the Court was able to focus on the rights of the parents, 
as the children‟s legal guardians, to determine the religion of „their‟ 
children. The Court held that it was “both the right and the responsibility of 
the [parents] to care for, guide, and direct their own children.”244 The Court 
found that the parents could only exercise their right to determine the 
children‟s religion if the children were returned to their custody.  By 
focusing on the rights of the parents, the children were treated as objects 
and the legal issue became determining the appropriate location of rights 
of control.  By locating this control within adults, the views of the children 
could also be discounted, as their views were not legally relevant to the 
issue of control rights.245   
 
Although adults have traditionally used conceptions of parental rights and 
responsibilities to enforce their own power over children, as occurred in H 
v F, the conception can also be used against parents unwilling to accept 
parental responsibilities.  This occurred in PN v BN [Parenting Orders],246 
where the Court used arguments of parental rights and responsibilities to 
force a reluctant father to spend more time with his children.  
 
As examined in this section, the conception that children are the objects of 
parental rights and responsibilities has a long history.  The law can use 
this conception to produce its knowledge about the world in a way that 
meets its own functional requirements.  This conception allows the law to 
reduce the complexity of family relationships into binary alternatives 
amenable to resolution through legal processes; conceptualising custody 
disputes as property disputes about the appropriate location of control 
rights is but one example of this reductive tendency.   
 
This conception is therefore closely related to and employed by existing 
power structures within society, particularly paternalistic power structures 
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that emphasise parental power over the lives of children.  As this power is 
often exercised physically through the use of physical discipline in the next 
conception I will examine the conception that children can be subject to 
the use of power through physical discipline. 
 
 
4.6 Conception 2:  Children need to be physically disciplined. 
 
The conception that children are the objects of parental rights is related to 
the conception that children can be physically disciplined.  As previously 
noted, the authority of the paterfamilias within Roman society originally 
extended to a „right of life and death‟ over children.247  Parental rights over 
children have also been conceptualised to include a right to exercise 
physical discipline, even if the absolute power available to a paterfamilias 
is no longer accepted.   
 
Many historians who write about the history of childhood argue that 
children have always been physically disciplined at home and that more 
humane methods of discipline did not develop until the middle of the 
eighteenth century.248 However, although it may be true that parents have 
always used discipline as a means of controlling their children, Pollock 
claims that it is not clear that physical violence was a predominant power 
tactic until the mid-eighteenth century.249   On the basis of her review of 
primary sources from 1500 to 1900 in Western Europe, Pollock argues 
that parents throughout this period employed various methods of 
disciplining children, including physical discipline, withdrawal of privileges, 
lectures, shame and remonstrations.250  She also argues that there is 
nothing to indicate a direct link between particular types of discipline and 
particular time periods or even beliefs.251  The types of discipline 
employed appear to have varied according to the particular nature of the 
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parents and children involved.252  She refers as examples to the journals 
of three parents from the seventeenth century, all of whom expressed a 
belief in the concept of Original Sin,253 but none of whom record 
administering physical punishment.254  One of the journals, in fact, 
specifically spoke out against such treatment.255   
 
Although the evidence presented by historians such as Pollock may be an 
accurate reflection of the approach taken by some parents, the evidence 
appears clear that physical punishment was the predominant method of 
discipline used in educational institutions, including universities, during the 
Middle Ages.256 There is also evidence that during the early Middle Ages, 
adults were often fiercely determined to “break the will” of children and 
enforce absolute obedience to adult authority through the use of physical 
discipline.257  However, the use of physical discipline to enforce obedience 
was not restricted to children during this period. 
 
Up until the 18th century at least, Western societies relied upon corporal 
punishment, often involving significant torture, to discipline and control 
both adults and children.258  Criminals and political and religious agitators, 
amongst others, often faced particularly gruesome physical discipline, 
torture and, in some cases, death as a consequence of their behaviour.259  
The physical body was the object of punishment when discipline was 
required for both adults and children.   
 
The focus on the physical body as the object of disciplinary punishment 
began to diminish during the nineteenth century and there has 
consequently been a reduction in the severity of the physical discipline of 
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adults over the last 200 years.260  Foucault argues that this does not 
reflect a reduction in the intensity of discipline itself.  Rather, he argues 
that the adult body now serves not as an object of punishment but simply 
as an intermediary with the object of punishment being the soul, that is, 
the “heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations” of the punished.261  The 
punishment involved has moved from physical punishment to deprivations 
of liberty and personal and property rights.262  However, these conceptual 
changes in the punishment of adults have not necessarily been reflected 
in the approaches taken by adults to the discipline of children and the 
physical discipline of children continues to play a part in many Western 
societies. 
 
Within New Zealand society, the physical discipline of children has been 
widely accepted as an essential child-raising tool for parents and 
caregivers since the colonisation process began.263  During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the physical discipline of children 
was practiced by parents and caregivers and by Government agencies.  
Even the Courts promoted physical punishment, sentencing boys to be 
whipped by the police or their fathers or stepfathers.264  Physical discipline 
was often considered to be a necessary accompaniment of education.  In 
1902, for example, 8-year-old Dorothy Drake was beaten by her mother 
and sisters for failing to repeat a lesson of verse. She subsequently died of 
her injuries.  Dorothy‟s mother was charged with her murder and at her 
trial she argued that the beating was simply legal, reasonable 
punishment.265  
 
It is therefore apparent that parental rights over children have often been 
defined to include a right for parents to exercise physical punishment.  
Attempts by the state to regulate this parental power have consequently 
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focused on protecting the rights of parents against the power of the state.  
This has been a feature of the legal response to child maltreatment for 
over 100 years. In 1885, for example, Alexander Fleming was charged in 
the Dunedin Supreme Court with causing grievous bodily harm to his son. 
The jury found that the father‟s „punishment‟ (tying his son to a bed and 
beating him with a cart whip) was „reasonable‟ chastisement and he was 
acquitted. During the trial, his defence counsel specifically argued to the 
jury that: 
 
 If they found the accused guilty of this offence, any one of them who was 
a father, if he gave his child anything like a smart whipping, would be 
liable to have a policeman force his way into the house, examine the 
child, get up a howl against the parent, and make him, as the prisoner had 
been during the past few weeks, an outcast of society.266  
 
Many adults in New Zealand society continue to argue that physical 
discipline is a legitimate tool of correction for wayward children and an 
important parental right that should not be compromised by the state.267  
One reason for this may be that, until relatively recently, children have had 
few, if any, rights.  As the punishment of adults has moved towards a 
focus on the deprivation of liberty, the punishment of children has not been 
able to follow this course to the same extent.  This is ultimately a reflection 
of the differing power relations that exist between adults and the state and 
between adults and children.  The relationship between adults and the 
state in Western democracies has increasingly been governed and 
constrained by rights recognised by the state.  With the increasing number 
of adult rights, the options for the state to discipline adults by removing 
rights have increased.  In contrast, the power relationships between 
children and adults are often more complex and are not founded on, or 
even predominantly formed by, the recognition of rights.  At most, what are 
often considered rights by adults for themselves, are considered to be 
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privileges for children.  Consequently, adult power over children‟s lives can 
continue to be exercised in a physical form.  The law is able to support this 
use of power by conceptualising children as objects of parental rights and 
defining these parental rights to include the power to exercise physical 
discipline.  
 
In this section I have examined the conception that parental rights over 
children include a right to use physical discipline. The law can use this 
conception to entrench the power of adults, particularly parents, over the 
lives of their children.  It also affects the way that the law produces its 
knowledge about the world by providing a normative framework for 
defining the use of adult force against children as discipline.  In chapter 6 I 
will examine the role that this conception played in the reform of s 59 of 
the Crimes Act 1961 and in chapter 7 I will examine how the law can use 
this conception to construct children as objects and thereby avoid any 
engagement with their subjective experience of parental force. Before 
doing so, I will argue in the next section that the conception that children 
need to be physically disciplined has often been justified by using 
conceptions of the innocence or corruption of children.   
 
 
4.7 Conception 3: Children are either innocent or corrupt. 
 
In this section I will briefly examine the historical development of concepts 
of childhood‟s inherent innocence or corruption.  I will then show how the 
law continues to employ these conceptions today when producing its 
knowledge about children. 
 
Aries argued that the influence of Christianity following the Middle Ages 
led to the acceptance of a belief in childhood innocence,268 with a 
concomitant belief in the spiritual weakness of children.269 These 
conceptions constructed children as vulnerable to corruption and 
consequently in need of protection from the corrupting influence of the 
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adult world. As this conception developed after the Middle Ages, Western 
society tried to strengthen childhood innocence through education and 
thereby develop character and the ability to reason.270  This education 
included an increasing focus on the discipline of children, particularly strict 
physical discipline, in order to preserve and protect their innocence from 
corruption.271 
 
The perceived need to protect children from the corruptions of the adult 
world also had implications for the topics considered appropriate to 
discuss with children.  To support his argument that a belief in childhood 
innocence developed after the Middle Ages, Aries made extensive use of 
the diaries of Henri IV‟s physician, who recorded the life of young Louis 
XII.  Aries argued that many of the events described in these diaries, 
particularly discussions of sexual matters with the young Louis XII, would 
not be acceptable in modern society given contemporary standards of 
morality.272  Given the apparent lack of the discretion considered 
appropriate by modern standards, Aries argued that until the seventeenth 
century adults believed that children were either unaware of or indifferent 
to sexual matters and that there was consequently no belief in childhood 
„innocence‟.273   
 
The conception of „innocence‟ that developed during this period perceived 
innocence to be a reflection of divinity; a state of freedom from the worldly 
corruptions of sin.  By doing so, conceptions of innocence established a 
binary distinction between innocent children and the sinful adult world. 
This distinction has been reflected in long-running philosophical debates 
regarding the nature of humanity, with philosophers such as Rousseau 
and Locke arguing that humanity is naturally innocent but corrupted by 
society274 and Hobbes and much of Christian tradition (from St Augustine 
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onwards in particular) arguing that humans are naturally sinful brutes, 
often as a consequence of Original Sin.275   
 
According to the Christian doctrine of Original Sin, children (as with all 
humanity) are considered to be inherently sinful and justly subject to divine 
judgement and punishment.  The growth of Calvinist theology during the 
Middle Ages reinforced these beliefs.276 Aries and subsequent historians 
have argued that the Christian doctrine of Original Sin was particularly 
influential in increasing the formality of adult/child relations from the 16th to 
the 18th centuries.277  Stone, for example, claims that child/adult relations 
during this period were characterised by “psychological coolness and 
physical severity.”278 
 
Physical severity was also justified by conceptualising children as innocent 
but vulnerable to corruption.  The following reference, taken from a 1532 
petition to close a brothel in Basel, exemplifies this conceptualisation: 
 
This house is nothing but a cause of corruption for youth ... Allowances 
may be made for childhood, which is not yet contaminated by sin; but the 
rod should always be within sight and close at hand.  Above all, youth 
should not be forgiven for anything; on the contrary, the more it is inclined 
to pleasure, the more it must be held in check by punishments and 
discouraged from the sin of luxury.279 
 
Adults could therefore employ both conceptions of Original Sin and 
conceptions of childhood innocence to justify the temporal (rather than 
divine) judgement and punishment of children by arguing that only harsh 
treatment would „cure‟ children of their inherent or potential sinfulness.280 
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However, care needs to be taken when making assumptions about the 
type of treatment children received from adults on the basis of the beliefs 
those adults expressed.  It cannot, for example, be assumed that parents 
with a belief in Original Sin and the potential sinfulness of their children 
treated their children harshly as a consequence of that belief.  Pollock 
notes that although Puritan parents were particularly focused on the 
consequences of Original Sin (as indicated by numerous journal entries by 
Puritan parents281), they 
 
were genuinely concerned for their children – they may have been 
polluted beings; but they were also „Lambs in the Fold‟ and deeply 
loved.282 
 
It is difficult to determine how this „deep love‟ was practically expressed by 
Puritan parents.  Stone claims that:  
 
 Puritans in particular were profoundly concerned about their children, 
loved them, cherished them, prayed over them and subjected them to 
endless moral pressure.  At the same time they feared and even hated 
them as agents of sin within the household, and therefore beat them 
mercilessly.283 
 
It must also be noted that the belief in Original Sin was not universal, even 
if it was a significant part of religious orthodoxy in Western Europe 
throughout the Middle Ages.  In 1628, John Earle expressed the view that 
children were born ignorant of sin,284 a view popularised by Locke‟s 
theory, published in 1690, that the mind is a tabula rasa.285   Nor was the 
belief in Original Sin new to the Middle Ages as the concept was 
developed primarily by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century A.D.286 It is 
therefore not clear that any increase in the formality or brutality of 
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adult/child relations during the Middle Ages can be attributed to a belief in 
Original Sin.  
 
It therefore appears that conceptions of childhood‟s innocence and 
childhood‟s corruption have developed simultaneously in Western society 
and have existed since, at least, the Middle Ages.  The law has made and 
continues to make use of both conceptions when responding to the needs 
of children.  
 
Conceptions of childhood corruption have been employed within New 
Zealand‟s legal system since its inception.  During the late nineteenth 
century, for example, adults charged with offences against children under 
New Zealand‟s child protection legislation287 frequently based their 
defences on allegations of dishonesty and behavioural difficulties with the 
child victims.288  For example, one stepmother charged with ill-treating her 
stepdaughter in a manner calculated to injure her health, argued that her 
stepdaughter was “idle, untruthful, dishonest and disobedient”.289  Such 
accusations constructed the child victim as corrupt, allied the accused with 
the forces of justice represented by the legal system and provided a 
powerful justification for physical chastisement (as Courts themselves 
regularly whipped children for crimes of dishonesty).290  
 
The law in New Zealand continues to use conceptions of childhood‟s 
corruption when responding to the needs of children, even though the 
secularisation of society has removed many of the conception‟s religious 
foundations in Original Sin. In K v K (No. 1)291 for example, a young boy 
was described as “hedonistic and immature” after expressing a desire to 
live with his father rather than his mother.  Conceptualising the child as 
„hedonistic‟ and therefore corrupt allowed the Court to disregard the child‟s 
wishes and „protect‟ the child from further corruption through the exercise 
of legal power.   
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Conceptions of corruption can also be employed within the modern legal 
system to discount the views of children when those views are considered 
to be manipulative.292  This approach was evident in Wishnowsky v 
Wishnowsky293 where the Court appointed psychologist reported that the 8 
year old child involved in the case had developed “a pattern of behaviour 
… to achieve or manipulate a situation to obtain what she wants …”294 A 
similar approach was evident in S v K [Parenting orders]295 where the 
child‟s view that he “would be happy not to see his mother at all”296 was re-
interpreted by the Court.  O‟Dwyer J considered that the child was 
attached to his mother and that his expressions to the contrary were part 
of his “battle” to achieve the result he desired, being a move to live with his 
father.297   
 
By conceptualising the children in these cases as corrupt (evidenced by 
their hedonism or exercise of manipulation) the law exercised its power to 
produce knowledge about the children involved in a way that allowed the 
Courts to discount the views the children expressed.  If different 
conceptions had been used, different knowledge would have been 
produced.  If, for example, the children had been conceptualised as 
innocent, their behaviour could have been interpreted quite differently as 
merely their exercise of a freedom to choose their own destiny.  
 
Concepts of childhood innocence have also played a role in New Zealand 
law since its inception.  During the nineteenth century, for example, 
conceptualising children as innocent led to legislation such as the 
Neglected and Criminal Children Act 1867.  This Act enabled the master of 
an industrial school to assume the guardianship of a neglected child when 
the child‟s parents were considered to be immoral or antisocial and 
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therefore unfit to exercise any parental rights.298 Conceptions of childhood 
innocence were also reflected in the Children‟s Protection Act 1890, which 
allowed the police to remove children without warrant in cases of neglect, 
abandonment, mistreatment or exposure.299  The provisions of this Act 
were broad enough to allow the police to remove children from situations 
not only of abuse but also of destitution300 or which were otherwise 
considered unsuitable in the vague context of the home being morally 
„bad‟.301 By conceptualising children as innocent, the law was therefore 
able to justify its use of power to protect them from the corrupting influence 
of immoral, dissolute or even destitute parents. 
 
Modern law continues to employ conceptions of childhood innocence.  
Many modern strategies of child protection are: 
  
[U]underpinned by theories of pollution; [that] adult society undermines 
childhood innocence and that children therefore must be segregated from 
the harsh realities of the adult world.302  
 
Conceptions of childhood innocence not only underpin entire strategies of 
child protection but the law also uses such conceptions to enforce a 
distinction between adults and children on a much more quotidian level.  
This was evident in Child, Youth and Family Services v Television New 
Zealand Ltd,303 a case involving the development of a care and protection 
plan under the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989.  
The plan included a specific requirement that the child “not be subjected to 
conversations about adult issues…”.304 As noted by Aries, conceptions of 
childhood innocence have often led to a concern about appropriate topics 
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of discussion.305  Such concepts define the content of ambiguous terms 
such as “adult issues.”   
 
In summary, the law uses conceptions of childhood innocence and 
corruption to segregate children from the world of adults.  By doing so the 
law reduces the complexity of the world as experienced by children into 
binary alternatives and reinforces adult power over children‟s lives.  A 
similar process occurs with the conception that adults are rationally 
competent whereas children are rationally incompetent. 
 
 
4.8 Conception 4:  Children are rationally incompetent. 
 
As previously noted, conceptions of childhood define the nature of the 
distinction between children and adults.306 Since concepts of rational 
thought began to predominate within Western society during the sixteenth 
century, a clear conceptual distinction has developed between adults and 
children based on the perceived capacity for rational thought.  In this 
section I will examine this conception and provide some examples of how 
the law continues to use it to produce its knowledge about children. 
 
The reification of rational thought arguably originates with ancient Greek 
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.307 However, it was not 
until the work of Descartes began to penetrate Western society that the 
modern focus on reason took hold.308 The resulting emphasis on rational 
thought influenced the development of conceptions of childhood that 
associated children with “irrationalism or pre-logicism”309 by the late Middle 
Ages. Rational competence began to be considered one of the attributes 
of mature adulthood, although only for adult males, and consequently, 
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children, as „not-yet-adults‟310, were conceptualised as rationally 
incompetent and immature.311  
 
Arguably, the conception that children are rationally incompetent merely 
reflects the physical realities of childhood development.  Research 
regarding the intellectual, social and moral development of children shows 
that children younger than 10 to 12 years of age generally “lack the 
cognitive abilities and judgemental skills necessary to make decisions 
about major events.”312 This lack is a developmental issue rather than a 
reflection of inexperience as research has shown that younger children are 
generally unable to think abstractly and have a limited sense of future 
time.313 However, to meet its functional requirement to reduce complexity, 
the law uses this social science research of to establish universal norms of 
competence that assume adult competence and the incompetence of all 
human beings younger than a specified age.314  Consequently, when 
children and young people seek to be recognised as competent, they bear 
the burden of establishing their rational competence and to do so they 
encounter the power of the law to produce its own knowledge about their 
lives.  
 
The law has the power to define such terms as “reason” and “rationally 
competent”. As the cases I will examine in this section show, the law 
establishes different definitions of “rationally competent” for adults and 
children. As noted by David Archard, in order to be considered rationally 
competent by the legal system children must display a level of 
competence that some adults lack in general and very many lack on 
occasion.315 Furthermore, the conception that children are rationally 
incompetent also contributes to a conception that because of their 
incompetence children are particularly vulnerable to manipulation.  
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One way in which the law uses the conception that children are 
incompetent is by requiring children to prove their competence as a 
prerequisite for giving them rights to participate in legal processes.  For 
children, competence itself is not the gateway to power over their own 
lives; being defined to be competent by the law is. This was evident in 
Clarke v Carson,316 where Elias J held that “the position at which it was 
right to take into account the views of children was the time when they are 
able to reason.”317  This decision conceptualised the children as inherently 
irrational, by virtue of their status as children and consequently their ability 
to participate could only arise when the Court considered that they 
exhibited the „adult‟ characteristic of rational thought. Using the perceived 
capacity to reason as a prerequisite for obtaining power not only applies to 
limited rights of participation, such as those referred to in Clarke v Carson, 
but also applies to rights of autonomy and freedom of action. 
 
The leading case in the area of the autonomy of children is the English 
case Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority 
(“Gillick”).318 In Gillick the Court was prepared to grant the applicant child 
rights of autonomy but required the grant of autonomy to be conditional on 
the child exhibiting sufficient rational competence.319 As noted above, the 
law has the power to define the content of such terms as “reason” and 
“rationally competent”320 and this was evident in the approach taken by the 
Court in Gillick, which established a test for rational competence based on 
“understanding”.321 
 
Gillick established a stringent approach to defining the rational capacity of 
children by insisting that children must have “sufficient understanding and 
intelligence to enable [them] to fully understand what is proposed” before 
they can be considered rational enough to make decisions regarding their 
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own lives.  This “understanding” includes an understanding of the “moral 
and family” questions involved in a decision.322  
 
The law in New Zealand has adopted the Gillick definition of rational 
competence for children.  In PJKR v DAR [Guardianship]323 for example, 
the Court held that s 6 of the Care of Children Act: 
 
does not require a Judge to give effect to [the wishes of children], 
particularly if the child is of an age where he or she is immature and has 
no real understanding of the longer term consequences of the wishes 
expressed [emphasis added].324  
 
Elias J took a similar approach in Clarke v Carson325 by assessing 
whether the children shared the Court‟s assessment of the longer terms 
consequences of the available options.  When considering the views of the 
children, Elias J tried to determine their ability to assess the “potential 
prize for them in re-establishing their relationship” with their father.326  
Elias J considered that the children did not give adequate weight to this 
“prize” in forming their views and on that basis the children and their 
mother were ordered to return to the United States, against the 
“vehement”327 wishes of the children.  
 
All three of these cases required the children involved to have a “real 
understanding of the longer term consequences” of their decisions before 
they could be considered rationally competent.  This requirement 
establishes a significant test for children to pass if they want to be defined 
as rationally competent and thereby obtain some degree of legally 
recognised autonomy over their own lives. However, it is not the only 
threshold they must overcome if they want be perceived as rationally 
competent.  
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In addition to an understanding of longer-term consequences, the law also 
defines rational competence to include an element of selfishness or self-
interest.  In T v Child, Youth and Family Services328 for example, an 
application by parents for one of their children to be returned to them from 
Child, Youth and Family Services‟ care was declined, despite the child‟s 
clearly expressed desire to return to the care of her parents.  Judge 
Clarkson observed that she did not consider the child‟s wishes to be 
“putting her own needs first”.329 Consequently the child‟s decision was 
considered to be evidence of her rational incompetence.  The Court then 
employed this conception of the child to justify withholding from her the 
power to decide or influence who would care for her. Rational 
competence, it appears, therefore includes an element of selfishness or 
self-interest. 
 
Selfishness and self-interest are both dependent on the existence of a 
sense of self.  As a result, for children to establish that they are rationally 
competent, they must also establish that they conceptualise themselves 
as individuals separate from their families.  This was evident in White v 
Northumberland,330 where the Family Court relied on the evidence of a 
Court appointed psychologist when assessing the child‟s maturity.  The 
psychologist held the view that the child was not mature enough to make 
decisions for himself, as he did not have a “clear separate sense of his 
own identity.”331 Assessments of the child‟s competence were clearly 
linked to the child‟s sense of individuality and independence.  
 
By defining the concept of rational competence to include an element of 
independence, the conception that children are rationally incompetent 
incorporates the related conception that are vulnerable to manipulation by 
the adults in their lives.  Conceptions of the vulnerability of children to such 
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manipulation may have played a part in the development of parental 
alienation syndrome.  This syndrome was developed to explain the 
hostility some children exhibit towards a non-residential parent during 
custody disputes.  It classified this hostility as a mental disorder brought 
about in a child by the malign, or at least misguided, manipulation and 
control of a residential parent.  In L v S332 for example, the Court 
appointed psychiatrist argued that the child‟s express wish to remain with 
her father was not an expression of her “true feelings” as she was 
suffering from parental alienation syndrome.  The law was therefore able 
to use parental alienation syndrome to define the child as rationally 
incompetent.  However, there are significant doubts about the validity of 
parental alienation syndrome.  
 
Sturge and Glaser note that parental alienation syndrome does not exist 
as a generally recognised psychological condition and is empirically and 
theoretically unsound.333  They point out that there are a number of 
reasons why a custodial parent may take a position of implacable hostility 
towards a non-custodial parent, many of which may be fully justified (a 
fear of violence or post-traumatic symptoms for example).334  Similar 
justifications exist for children who express hostility towards one parent 
and the existence of such reasonable justifications needs to be 
acknowledged and respected.  A full review of parental alienation 
syndrome is beyond the scope of this thesis.  For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that the legal system‟s use of the syndrome is arguably a 
result of the law employing conceptions of childhood‟s incompetence and 
consequent vulnerability to manipulation to meet its own functional 
requirements.  By accepting the syndrome, the law acquires a normative 
basis for reducing the complexity of family relationships. The law can 
therefore use the conception that children are rationally incompetent and 
consequently vulnerable to manipulation to discount the views children 
express and entrench adult power over their lives. 
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The law can also use conceptions of incompetence and vulnerability to 
manipulation without invoking parental alienation syndrome.  In H v F335 
for example, the Court employed these conceptions to disregard the 
children‟s views. As previously noted, the parents in H v F had previously 
left their two children in the care of their religious grandparents and the 
children did not want to return to the custody of their apostate parents. 336  
Although the Court considered the children‟s religious beliefs to be 
honestly held and not the result of fear or coercion,337 it also held that their 
views were “an expected result in the circumstances in which they have 
been brought up and have been living …”.338 This focus on the inevitability 
of the children‟s beliefs allowed the Court to discount those beliefs.339  
This focus conceptualized the children as incompetent, vulnerable and 
passive victims of external influence and manipulation rather than as 
competent agents in the construction of their own realities. C v F340 
provides an instructive contrast to this approach. 
 
The case of C v F341 involved a custody application for a child who, 
because of his religious belief, clearly expressed a view that he did not 
want his apostate mother to receive staying access rights. Both H v F and 
C v F therefore required the legal system to interpret the views of religious 
children.  In C v F Inglis J held that:  
 
The question whether it was wise to allow [the child] to form those beliefs 
is less important than the present fact that he has them and that they 
regulate his attitude and behaviour.342 
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This approach clearly respected the autonomy of the child as rational and 
competent within his social and family context.  By refusing to 
conceptualise the child as incompetent, vulnerable and passive, the law 
was able to allow the child to exercise some power over his own life.   
 
All of the cases I have examined in this chapter, with the exception of C v 
F, illustrate that in assessing the rational competence of children the law 
applies higher standards of competence than it applies to adults.  For 
children to be considered rationally competent they need to exhibit an 
understanding of long-term consequences that is not required of 
competent adults. Under contract law, for example, adults are considered 
to be competent to contract if they understand the nature of the 
contractual act itself, not necessarily the long-term consequences of the 
contract.343  Furthermore, although children live within family contexts, to 
be considered rationally competent they must exhibit some independence 
and even selfishness.  
 
Conceptualising children as a group to be irrational and vulnerable to 
manipulation limits the law‟s ability to employ images of children as 
competent, rational agents in the construction of their own lives.344 
However, the law continues to employ the conception that children are 
irrational.  This is useful for the law because it establishes a clear binary 
distinction between adults and children that simplifies decision-making 
processes. By using the conception, the law is therefore engaged in a 
process of producing knowledge about children in order to meet its own 
functional requirements.  This knowledge may approximate reality, but is 
different from it, and as a result separates the operations of the law from 
the outside world. 
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4.9 Conclusions 
 
Conceptions of childhood over the last 200 years have constructed a stark 
dichotomy between adults and children.  Adults have been conceptualised 
as “mature, rational, competent, social and autonomous.”345 In contrast, 
children have been variously conceptualised as innocent, corrupt, objects 
of the rights and responsibilities of others, irrational, incompetent and 
vulnerable. These conceptions were traditionally considered to be merely 
a statement of the universal and unchanging nature of adults and children. 
However, these conceptions are, to a significant extent, socially 
constructed, context dependent and changeable. They do not simply 
reflect the unchanging nature of adults and children, but serve to reinforce 
adult power over children and actively construct what it means to be a 
child in Western society.  
 
The law uses conceptions of childhood to establish norms that allow the 
law to meet its functional requirement of reducing complexity to a level 
amenable to the legal system‟s decision-making processes. By doing so 
the law produces its own knowledge about the world and this knowledge 
excludes from consideration the unique and particular needs of individual 
children.  The world constructed by the law therefore differs from the world 
as subjectively experienced by children themselves, as predicted by the 
theories of Luhman and Teubner examined in chapter two.  This is 
autopoietic, operative closure in action and prevents the law from 
adequately responding to children‟s needs. 
 
The use of conceptions of childhood can also operate actively to accord 
privileges to those who best exhibit or represent the norms established by 
such conceptions.346 The legal system‟s operative closure therefore 
maintains existing power structures within society347 and this is 
exacerbated for children because of their general powerlessness. 
Habermas argues that rights give rights-holders power by enabling them 
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to participate in the production of knowledge and this argument lies behind 
an increasing focus on recognising the rights of children.  To overcome the 
problems arising from operative closure and improve the law‟s ability to 
respond adequately to the needs of children, many advocates for children 
have focused on distributing power to children by granting them legal 
rights. In the next chapter I will therefore examine the role of rights within 
the legal system and whether granting children rights is able to overcome 
the legal system‟s operative closure and improve the law‟s ability to 
respond to child maltreatment. 
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Chapter 5      Children‟s Rights 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will argue that granting rights to children is an attempt to 
redistribute power to them and enable them to participate in the production 
of knowledge about their lives. The legal system promises to exercise 
power on the behalf of rights-holders and granting rights to children is 
therefore an attempt to use the law to redistribute power to them.  
However, the effectiveness of legal rights as a mechanism for 
redistributing power is entirely dependent on the law‟s ability to 
communicate and enforce this transfer of power outside the world of the 
law.   
 
In this chapter I will argue that granting rights to children can fail to transfer 
power to children because of the legal system‟s operative closure, as 
described by Luhman and Teubner. I will also note that because 
Habermas‟ critique of operative closure is dependent upon rights of 
participation, rights not generally given to children, granting rights to 
children does not generally empower children or overcome operative 
closure.  I will begin this chapter by examining rights theories in general 
and the theoretical development of rights as a legal tool to redistribute 
power to children.    
 
5.2 What are rights? 
 
Defining a „right‟ is inherently difficult. The difficulties of defining the 
content of rights in general and children‟s rights in particular, emphasise 
that the phrase “childrens‟ rights” is, as noted by Hilary Rodham, “a slogan 
in search of a definition.”348  In part, these difficulties arise because 
advocating for children‟s legal rights raises significant and difficult issues 
regarding family autonomy, state responsibility and the independence of 
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children.349  The difficulty of defining legal rights also allows room for the 
language of rights to be subverted and employed to  
 
mask the ugly realities behind the law, realities such as greed, pursuit of 
self-interest, abuse of power, and oppression; … society‟s power wielders 
can manipulate the meaning of „rights‟ in any way they wish because that 
concept is vague and indeterminate.350 
 
Ultimately, attempting to define „rights‟ involves an attempt to answer 
fundamental questions regarding the significance of human life itself.  Are 
all human beings equal?  Is each human life inherently „special‟ and 
„unique‟ and thereby entitled to exercise certain claims against the rest of 
society?  Are simple utilitarian considerations sufficient to form the basis of 
social policy and legal decisions?  Definitions of rights are dependent on 
how these questions are answered.  To understand human rights it is 
therefore necessary to examine the various arguments that have been 
used to justify the creation of rights.  
 
Historically, rights claims have been justified on the basis of religious belief 
and developed by inductive processes from premises accepted by faith by 
a significant part of Western society.351  However, given the pluralisation of 
modern societies, appeals to metaphysical grounds of authority are no 
longer universally accepted.352  Consequently, arguments for rights in 
modern Western societies have had to find alternative sources of 
validity353 and this is one of the primary philosophical difficulties for 
modern rights discourses.354  This issue is particularly significant for 
attempts to establish international human rights instruments, such as the 
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UNCRC, which must lay claim to universality and eschew reliance on 
particular religious or cultural norms.355 
 
One consequence of the loss of universally accepted norms is the criticism 
of claims that rights are universally applicable.  Without a universally 
accepted theoretical justification for rights, many theorists argue that rights 
are dependent on social and cultural contexts.356 This conditional 
approach to rights is supported by the arguments of philosophers such as 
David Hume, who argued that absolute rights are unfeasible on the basis 
of his scepticism of absolutes derived through rational processes.357 If 
absolute rights are not philosophically possible, individual communities 
have the freedom and the responsibility of not only defining the rights they 
will recognise but also specifying which rights they will consider to be the 
most significant.358  Bandman, for example, argues that communities must 
generate their own rights to meet their own particular social needs and 
that when that community‟s resources are limited, rights talk “loses its 
point” for that community and the rights can be revoked.359  Modern 
communities therefore need to develop their own justifications for 
acknowledging legal rights. 
 
In broad terms, there are two modern rights theories that attempt to 
provide a reasoned justification for legal rights without reference to the 
absolutes of natural law or religious belief.  The first argues that having a 
legal right is a legal recognition of a particular individual‟s choice as being 
pre-eminent over the will of others in relation to particular decisions (often 
referred to as the “choice” or “will” theory of rights).360  The second 
approach argues that legal rights recognise and protect the interests of 
individuals by imposing normative constraints on other individuals within 
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society (often referred to as the “interest” theory of rights).361  These 
theories offer quite different and ultimately competing justifications for 
rights discourses and I will therefore examine each of these theories in 
turn.362 
 
5.3 Rights protect the freedom to choose 
 
5.3.1 Choice-based rights 
 
The first approach to justifying legal rights is that rights can be justified on 
rational grounds because they protect and enable the freedom of 
individuals to act as they choose within reasonable limits.  These theories 
are often based on Kant‟s claim that “freedom is the one sole and original 
right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity.”363  The 
focus on freedom of choice is particularly significant for children and has 
led some commentators to advocate for fewer protections for and the even 
the removal of adult control over children on the basis that children, like 
adults, should be free to make their own choices.364   
 
This approach is evident in the introduction to John Holt‟s Escape from 
Childhood where he proposed that: 
 
the rights, privileges, duties, responsibilities of adult citizens be made 
available to any young person, of whatever age, who wants to make use 
of them.  These would include, among others: 
 
1. The right to equal treatment at the hands of the law – i.e., the 
 right, in any situation, to be treated no worse than an adult would 
be. 
2. The right to vote, and take full part in political affairs. 
... 
4. The right to work, for money. 
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… 
8. The right to travel, to live away from home, to choose or make 
one‟s own home. 
… 
10. The right to make and enter into, on a basis of mutual consent, 
quasi-familial relationships outside one‟s own immediate family – 
i.e., the right to seek and choose guardians other than one‟s own 
parents and to be legally dependant on them. 
11. The right to do, in general, what any adult may legally do.365 
 
This approach therefore seeks to secure for children the same freedoms 
of choice enjoyed by adults.  However, as noted by Martha Minow, 
granting independence to any member of society is not simply a rational 
decision based on scientific measures of competence; rather the grant of 
independence is a political or moral choice made by those in positions of 
power.366  Consequently, power structures within society, particularly 
systems emphasising parental control over children (and supported by the 
conceptions of childhood described in chapter 4), play a significant role in 
restricting and preventing the implementation of proposals such as Holt‟s 
within the legal system.  However, although the extreme views of theorists 
such as John Holt are seldom put forward today, similar choice-based 
rights arguments have had an impact on legislative and judicial activity in 
recent years367 by encouraging an increasing focus on the appropriate age 
boundaries for „protection‟ rights to apply.  
 
5.3.2 Age restrictions 
 
The legal system operates on the basis of a number of age restrictions 
that establish arbitrary boundaries between adulthood and childhood. For 
most purposes, the law deems children to be adults when they reach 18 
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years of age.368  However, the process of moving from the legal status of 
childhood to adulthood is marked by inconsistencies and contradictions.369  
The existence of a variety of arbitrary legal age boundaries is an example 
of the extent to which conceptions of childhood are socially constructed: 
those in positions of power determine who is a child and what rights are 
available at different ages of development and for different purposes.370  
Choice-based rights theories challenge this use of power and encourage 
an examination of age boundaries.  
 
The more extreme choice-based theories such as Holt‟s argue for the 
removal of arbitrary age boundaries altogether, on the grounds that they 
restrict the rights of children to make their own choices.  However, re-
evaluations of arbitrary age boundaries often focus on changes to arbitrary 
boundaries, rather than on removing such boundaries altogether.  In 1999, 
for example the legal age for purchasing alcohol in New Zealand was 
reduced from 20 to 18 following a re-evaluation of the appropriate age 
boundary.371  The freedom to choose to purchase alcohol was withheld 
from those younger than 18 years of age; one arbitrary boundary was 
replaced with another.  Although choice-based rights theories may not 
have succeeded in removing age boundaries such as the age for 
purchasing alcohol, they have succeeded in encouraging a re-evaluation 
of many of these boundaries.   
 
Choice-based rights theories have led to an increasing focus on 
appropriate age boundaries because they actively question the 
appropriate extent of parental control over the lives of children. This is 
particularly evident in the areas of youth pregnancy and contraception.372  
Approaches to these issues can take a variety of forms: parental control 
can be removed entirely from a fixed age; children can be given decision 
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making powers subject to parental veto rights;373 or parental control can 
be made subject to the individual capacity and maturity of particular 
children.374  When the issue of parental control is considered within the 
legal system, the result often depends upon a determination of the 
particular child‟s rational capacity. The law therefore uses conceptions of 
rational competence, as considered in detail in chapter four, to determine 
whether children have a right to be free from parental control. This 
consideration is not required once a child reaches the relevant statutory 
age boundaries at which point they automatically receive the right to 
exercise the same freedoms as adults. 
 
5.3.3 Participation rights 
 
Choice-based rights theories have also influenced the development of 
other rights, particularly rights of participation.  The right for children to 
participate in decision-making about their lives is a particularly significant 
right and has developed from an emphasis on valuing the choices children 
make.  However, rights of participation for children are not generally 
absolute rights. Article 12 of the UNCRC for example, one of the 
foundations for children‟s legal rights of participation, does not give 
children rights of self-determination but only a right to “try to motivate or to 
persuade the adult to choose as the child herself would choose if allowed 
to.”375  This limited participation right can be exercised to express 
preferences or to express a particular perspective376 and is limited to 
participation in private decision-making rather than in the public decision 
making processes of democracy.   
 
On a practical level, research indicates that participation in decision-
making has psychological benefits for children even when their 
participation is not determinative of the outcome and that, in any event, 
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children often do not want decision-making power.377  On a theoretical 
level, even limited participation rights are significant because they 
recognise children as “full human beings, with integrity and personality and 
with the ability to participate fully in the production of knowledge about 
their lives.”378  Participation rights seek to transfer to children some of the 
law‟s creative power to produce knowledge and thus ensure that the legal 
system evaluates children as individual human beings.379  Participation 
rights are therefore an attempt to overcome the legal system‟s operative 
closure when producing knowledge about children.  
 
Because participation rights play a significant role in the production of 
knowledge, they are a significant element of Habermas‟ critique of 
operative closure. As previously noted, Habermas argues that the 
legitimacy of the legal process is dependent upon protecting the rights of 
those subject to the law to participate in the processes of law‟s creation.380  
Rehg argues that women‟s struggle for equality illustrates Habermas 
argument because, by valuing participation rights, women recognised that:  
 
[T]he legitimate regulation of [gender equality] requires that women 
themselves take part in public discussions that determine which gender 
differences are relevant to definitions of equality.381 
 
However, as noted above, when participation rights are given to children, 
they are generally only given in a limited form.  Children are not generally 
given rights to take part in public discussions that determine which age 
differences are relevant to definitions of equality between adults and 
children.  Consequently, Habermas‟ theory of communicative action does 
not address the interests of children or the operative closure of the legal 
system in its responses to children. 
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5.3.4 Some problems with choice-based rights 
 
Choice-based rights advocates argue that children should have the same 
rights as adults to exercise free choice. However, concomitant with 
freedom of choice is the freedom to waive the exercise of a power to 
choose.  This ability to waive a right creates difficulties for using choice-
based rights theories to justify rights for children.  Children are often not 
given any choice in relation to the exercise of their rights and the exercise 
of their rights is often considered to be compulsory and not susceptible to 
waiver.382  Some of these difficulties can be overcome by recognising that 
some rights (the right to live, for example) are not capable of waiver, even 
for adults, but this argument simply moves the argument to another level 
of analysis.  If some rights can be waived and others cannot, which rights 
fall within which category? Choice-based rights theories therefore fail to 
describe how children‟s rights generally operate in practice.  Further 
difficulties with a choice-based rights approach to children‟s rights can 
arise given the relationship between rights and duties.   
 
Within the choice-based rights paradigm, the freedom to choose383 is 
inevitably linked to duties; when an individual has freedom to exercise a 
particular choice, other individuals have the duty to respect, or at least not 
to interfere with the exercise of that choice.  Consequently, rights become 
equivalent to legal powers to enforce or waive duties.384 This relationship 
between rights and duties can have consequences that may not be in the 
best interests of children.385  As an example, calls to give children greater 
rights have been matched by calls to make children more „responsible‟ for 
their criminal behaviour.386 
 
Defining rights as a power to exercise individual choices also raises 
significance issues of enforceability.  Bandman, for example, argues that 
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the ability for a rights holder to claim their rights is important because, 
without such an ability, “… one could not cash in on one‟s rights …”387 
This view is grounded in the theories of J. S. Mill who argued that:  
 
 The rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from 
 being disregarded when the person interested is himself (sic) able and 
habitually disposed to stand up for them.388 
 
The need to be able to “cash in” on or “stand up for” rights is particularly 
significant for children as they are often unable to claim rights for 
themselves.  If rights are designed to empower individuals to make their 
own choices, they can become meaningless for those who do not have 
any power to exercise their rights.  Choice theorists attempt to overcome 
this difficulty when applying rights to children by arguing that choices are 
made on behalf of children by the adults in their lives (generally parents) 
or, in some circumstances, by the state.389  However, even if this view is 
correct, children‟s rights remain unsecured and meaningless until some 
legal institution or competent adult recognises those rights and accepts 
responsibility for enforcing them.390  
 
5.3.5 Summary 
 
In summary, choice-based rights theorists argue that children should be 
given the freedom to make their own choices independently of parental 
and state control and that rights are required to give children the power 
they need to exercise this freedom.  These arguments have led to an 
increasing recognition of the importance of increasing the legal 
independence and autonomy given to children as they develop.  Although 
significant difficulties are involved with assessing maturity and the 
appropriate level of autonomy children should be given as they develop, 
children are increasingly given limited rights to participate in decisions 
affecting their lives in recognition of their right, generally considered to be 
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a developing right, to personal freedom.  By giving children such rights, 
the law attempts to redistribute some social power from the adults who 
previously had complete control over the lives of children, to children 
themselves.  However, there are a number of conceptual difficulties with 
choice-based rights theories, particularly in relation to the limited power of 
children to enforce any rights granted to them. Advocates of rights theories 
based on children‟s interests claim that they avoid these difficulties. 
 
5.4 Rights protect interests 
 
5.4.1 Interests 
 
The second approach to justifying rights for children argues that some 
individual „interests‟ should be protected by the imposition of normative 
constraints on the actions of other people391 and that legal rights provide 
this normative constraint.  Whereas choice-based approaches are 
designed to empower children to exercise free choice, interest based 
theories are designed to protect children by exercising power on their 
behalf.  By focusing on protecting children, interest-based theories 
entrench the distinction between adulthood and childhood and the power 
of adults over the lives of children. 
 
Interest-based rights theories are founded on the belief that the interests 
of children are different from the interests of adults and consequently 
those interests cannot be satisfied by granting to children the same rights 
granted to adults, even if such rights are strictly enforced.392  This 
approach therefore argues that there are morally relevant differences 
between adults and children that justify protectionist measures, even when 
those measures constrain the autonomy of children.393  These 
protectionist measures are justified using conceptions of childhood, such 
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as those examined in chapter four,394 to support claims that the interests 
of children differ from those of adults. 
 
The conception that children are the objects of adult rights and 
responsibilities395 can be used within a rights discourse to argue that 
children‟s special interests need to be protected by granting children a 
wider range of rights than those given to adults.  Such arguments have 
been used to advocate for children‟s rights to receive protection from 
abuse, neglect or exploitation and rights to adequate food, shelter and 
healthcare.396  However, although granting such wide-ranging rights is 
possible, giving such rights real efficacy is a real challenge given practical 
resource limitations.  The UNCRC, for example, recognises rights for 
children that extend beyond civil and political rights to cover social, 
economic, cultural and humanitarian rights397 even though it is not 
necessarily able to enforce these normative standards.398 Such rights are 
dependent upon the existence of individuals and entities capable of 
accepting duties to fulfil such rights.399 
 
It is important to recognise that the interests involved in these arguments 
are the interests of individuals, not necessarily the interests of society or 
the wider community.  The interests of the wider community can be used 
as a justification for granting rights to children by arguing that it is in the 
community‟s interest to give rights to children in order to avoid the social 
problems that can arise from childhood neglect.  However, this utilitarian 
approach is dangerous as it can also be used to remove rights from those 
who are perceived to offer little benefit to society.  Rights advocates such 
as MacCormick therefore argue that children are morally entitled to rights 
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given their inherent value as human beings and the interests they hold as 
individuals.400  Defining the content of the concept of „interest‟ is therefore 
particularly important. 
 
The term „interests‟ covers a wide variety of conceptions and can, for 
example, include autonomy interests (an interest in choosing freely), 
developmental interests (an interest in having the same rights as other 
members of society to self-development) and basic interests to health and 
protection from neglect and violence.401  These different interests can be 
mutually exclusive.  For example, granting an individual a right that 
recognises their interest in personal autonomy may conflict with their 
developmental interests if they exercise their autonomy in a way that 
restricts their developmental interests (either present, future or both)402 or 
the autonomy rights of others.  A significant problem for interest-based 
rights theories is therefore the difficulty of defining those interests that are 
worthy of legal protection.  
 
Most interest-based rights advocates accept that legal rights should not 
protect all personal interests.403  Attempts to identify those interests that 
should be protected by legal rights have sometimes incorporated the 
arguments regarding the significance of liberty and autonomy that form the 
basis of choice-based approaches to rights.404  J. S. Mill, for example, 
argued that because each adult is the best positioned to choose what is in 
their own best interests they should have rights to personal autonomy in 
order to protect those interests.405  However, interest-based approaches to 
rights can also proceed on the basis, specifically expressed in Brown v 
Argyll,406 that human beings are frequently not the “best arbiters of their 
own best interests.”407  This issue is even more complex for children‟s 
interests than it is for adults.  Children are often conceptualised as 
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rationally incompetent408 and, as a result, adults are often empowered to 
make decisions on their behalf to protect their interests.  
 
5.4.2 Power 
 
The empowerment of adults as decision makers is particularly significant 
within the legal system.  The law often recognises that children have 
interests and that legal processes must operate in their „best interests‟.409 
However, because the law generally conceptualises children as rationally 
incompetent, their best interests are generally assessed by adults, not by 
children themselves.410  Consequently, interest-based rights do not 
transfer decision-making power to children but entrench and justify adult 
power over their lives. 
 
The entrenchment of adult power through interest-based rights for children 
contrasts with rights justified on the grounds of recognizing a right to 
freedom of choice.  Choice-based rights are founded on a conception of 
children as agents, actively engaged in producing knowledge about their 
own lives.  These two conflicting approaches to the development of rights 
can therefore create conflicts between the legal interests of children, as 
assessed by adults, and the freedoms of children.  Consequently, rights 
that are justified on the grounds that the interests of children need 
protection do not assert that children should have more autonomy or 
freedom than adults nor do they seek to change the status of children as 
subject to adult power.411  Rather, such claims advocate for greater state 
intervention in the control of children thereby allowing the substitution of 
one adult decision maker (an inadequate parent for example) with another 
adult (generally a state representative).   
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The transfer of power over the lives of children from the private to the 
public realm advocated by interest-based rights theories raises a number 
of significant practical issues.412  One such issue is determining who 
should be given such power if it is removed from parents.  If the decision-
making power is not given to children themselves the other options are the 
wider family, community or the state.  In general, modern approaches 
have not questioned whether public intervention is appropriate but have 
focused on how to ensure that such intervention is effective.413 
 
The effectiveness of public intervention is often limited because of the 
practical difficulties of transferring parental power.  Wald argues that the 
transfer of parental power can be practically unrealistic,  
 
 unless we are prepared to place an outside monitor in every home to 
eliminate the authority parents have stemming from their greater strength 
and economic power.414 
 
Adult power is therefore an inherent part of interest-based rights for 
children.  Such rights operate to entrench adult power rather than 
empower children.  This has significant implications when considering 
Habermas‟ response to operative closure given his theoretical 
dependence on participation rights that empower participation in 
democratic processes.  When children‟s rights are founded on interest-
based theories that confirm adult power, children are excluded from, or at 
least not empowered to participate in, democratic processes of knowledge 
creation.  As a consequence, interest-based rights do not empower 
children to overcome the legal system‟s operative closure. 
 
5.4.3 Summary 
 
Interest-based rights theories use conceptions of childhood to produce 
particular knowledge about the nature of children and their interests.  
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These conceptions distinguish children from adults and are used to justify 
claims that children have unique interests that need to be protected by 
adults with power over their lives.  Interest-based rights theories therefore 
use rights as a mechanism to entrench private adult power over the lives 
of children on the assumption that adults will use this power in the „best 
interests‟ of children.  The law can also use such theories to justify the 
transfer of private power over children to public institutions, although there 
are difficulties with exercising and enforcing such power transfers.  
However, in either case, children themselves are excluded from exercising 
power over their lives and this includes excluding children from knowledge 
creation processes.  In this way, interest-based rights theories can 
contribute to the legal system‟s operative closure.  Habermas‟ theory of 
communicative action does not overcome this operative closure.  
 
Choice-based and interest-based rights theories share foundations in 
moral arguments presented as uncontestable assertions.  In the following 
section, I will examine these moral arguments. 
 
5.5 Morality as the foundation for rights. 
 
MacCormick, a prominent interest-based rights theorist, bases his 
argument for rights on  
 
 a simple and barely contestable assertion: at least from birth, every child 
has a right to be nurtured, cared for, and, if possible, loved, until such time 
as he or she is capable of caring for himself or herself.415 
 
The moral basis of this “barely contestable assertion” is the argument that 
respecting the inherent dignity of every individual and the corresponding 
need to respect individual interests is a fundamental moral principle.416 
Dworkin also argues that there is a close association between rights and 
the moral values of human dignity and respect417 and this approach is 
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accepted by a number of other rights theorists as a sufficient basis for 
granting rights to children.418  
 
The argument that children are entitled to rights on moral grounds on the 
basis of their interests is summarised by MacCormick as follows: 
 
 each and every child is a being whose needs and capacities command 
our respect, so that denial to any child of the wherewithal to meet his or 
her needs and to develop his or her capacities would be wrong in itself (at 
least in so far as it is physically possible to provide the wherewithal), and 
would be wrong regardless of the ulterior disadvantages or advantages to 
anyone else – so to argue, would be to put a case which is intelligible as a 
justification for the opinion that children have such rights.419 
 
This foundation on morality moves concepts of rights, including rights for 
children, into the realm of “essentially contested concepts”420 and, 
consequently, the search for conceptual consensus regarding the 
theoretical justification of rights may well be futile.  This does not mean 
however, that the discussion should not be undertaken, as there is 
inherent value in discussing the issues involved,421 simply that resolution 
of the debate may be impossible.  However, the impossibility of defining 
the conceptual basis for rights, contributes to a number of difficulties when 
rights are applied. 
 
5.6 Some problems with rights. 
 
Particular problems arise when rights discourses are applied to children as 
children acquire legal rights in a way that is generally discontinuous and 
abrupt.422  Chronological dividing lines are often used to define individuals 
as children, young people or adults with different rights being legally 
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recognised at each stage.423  The right to vote, for example, confers a 
certain status instantaneously at a legally defined age.  In contrast, the 
maturing process is gradual and varies widely between individuals.  
Consequently, the legal system‟s need for rights-bearers acquiring rights 
abruptly fails to reflect the reality of life for many children and young 
people.  As David Archard notes:   
 
A young person just below the age of majority is less like an infant and 
more like an adult.  Yet its legal status remains that of the former.424  
 
Further difficulties arise as a result of the individualist focus of legal rights.  
Within traditional, Western liberal ideology, the creation of legal rights is 
justified by a belief in the significance of individuals.425  Choice-based 
rights theories emphasise individual choice whereas interest-based 
theories emphasise individual interests, but both focus on individuals as 
rights-holders.  
 
A focus on individual rights-holders is a functional requirement of Western 
legal systems as it allows the law to simplify and reduce complex relations 
within families and societies to a more manageable level.  However, by 
producing its knowledge about the world in this reductionist way, the law 
produces a vision of the world that ignores the impact of wider social, 
economic, political and cultural conditions in the shaping of social 
phenomena.426  The law then responds to this simplified, abstract world by 
using rights to transfer power within that world.  The individualist focus of 
rights therefore contributes to the operative closure of the legal system by 
avoiding engagement with wider, contextual issues. 
 
By avoiding engagement with wider contextual issues, legal rights 
construct social conflicts as contests between individuals427 and this 
allows the legal system to adopt its familiar processes of establishing 
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binary alternatives and then using legal procedures to decide between 
those binaries.428  By constructing intra-family difficulties as contests 
between individual rights bearers, the law can operate to construct barriers 
between family members, restrict genuine communication and 
interaction429 and fail to address the contextual preconditions to successful 
relationships.430  The individualist focus of rights therefore overlooks 
alternative constructions of reality that recognise the inter-dependence 
that characterises most, if not all, human relationships and the importance 
of relational values such as love and compassion.431   
 
Some critics of rights focus on the need to develop and encourage 
relational values rather than focusing on the narrow conceptions of 
individual rights, particularly when considering rights for children.  
However, recognising the fundamental importance of relational values in 
children‟s lives does not preclude the pragmatic recognition that this ideal 
does not reflect the realities of life for some children.  The rights of 
individuals can play a part in establishing minimum standards for the 
benefit of all children, not just those who are fortunate to develop in loving 
and supportive relational environments.432  Recognising rights for 
individuals does not preclude the exercise of the other morally significant 
values based on inter-dependence.433  Relying on idealised visions of 
familial or community love and support without providing a legal minimum 
level of protection for vulnerable members of society as individuals is 
arguably a misguided and perilous form of optimism.434 
 
The most significant difficulty with legal rights is that they are legal 
operations caught within the legal system.  As Freeman notes:  
 
 It is easy to take the words for the act and assume that with the 
enactment of rights-bestowing provisions the conditions of children‟s lives 
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has changed.  The importance of legislation as a symbol cannot be 
underestimated, but the recognition of children‟s rights requires 
implementation in practice.435 
 
This observation emphasises that the effectiveness of legal rights as a 
mechanism for redistributing power is entirely dependent on the law‟s 
ability to implement this transfer of power outside the closed world of the 
law.  However, its power to do this is limited because of the limitations 
inherent in the legal system itself. Rights are designed to transfer legal 
power to children but the legal system uses rights to produce its own world 
to respond to, a world distinct from the subjective worlds of those subject 
to it.  The law uses rights to reduce complexity through a focus on 
individuals and to exercise power over children.  Even when rights are 
established to empower children, as with participation rights, the law uses 
its power to define concepts such as competence and maturity to restrict 
any intended transfer of power.  All of these factors limit the law‟s ability to 
use rights to regulate the world outside the legal system.  These limitations 
are particularly evident in the way in which rights are used to advocate for 
law reform and I will examine this point in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6     Creating the Law 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will examine how the law is created, by examining the 
recent amendment to s 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 (“the Crimes Act”). I will 
argue that the process of law reform evident from the s 59 amendment 
process supports Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims that the law operates as 
a closed system. I will also show that Habermas‟ theory offers a useful 
critique of how law reform processes operate within the political system.  I 
will not attempt to explicate or assess the content of the new amended 
section, but will simply aim to illustrate how the operative closure of the 
legal system affected the processes involved with amending the law.  I will 
also show how the old s 59 and the reform debate both employed many of 
the conceptions of childhood examined in chapter four and rights 
arguments discussed in chapter five.  I will argue that the ways in which 
the legal system employed normative conceptions and abstract rights 
contributed to the legal system‟s operative closure throughout the law 
reform process.  
 
As previously noted, the operative closure of the legal system arises, in 
part, because of the legal system‟s functional requirement to reduce 
human complexity into binary alternatives amenable to being defined as 
either legal or illegal.436  One of the law‟s primary responses to child 
maltreatment is to apply this legal/illegal distinction to the treatment of 
children by adults.  In this way, the law produces knowledge about the 
world by exercising its power to define boundaries for the legally 
acceptable treatment of children.  In New Zealand, this occurs most clearly 
under the Crimes Act, which codifies definitions of criminal behaviour.  
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6.2 Defining the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. 
 
Under the Crimes Act, the physical and sexual abuse of children is 
generally treated in the same was as the physical and sexual abuse of 
adults and is defined to be illegal.  Crimes such as wounding with intent (s 
188) or common assault (s 196) are committed regardless of whether the 
victim is an adult or a child. However, in addition to the general criminal 
offences where the identity of the victim is irrelevant, the Crimes Act also 
contains a number of offences specifically aimed at protecting children 
from maltreatment. Section 194, for example, creates a specific offence for 
adults who assault children under 14 years of age.437  However, in addition 
to creating child specific crimes, the Crimes Act also provides for a child 
specific defence in s 59.438 
 
Whenever it is alleged that a crime has been committed against a child, 
whether it is a „general‟ crime, such as wounding with intent, or a child 
specific crime, such as adult assaults child, an accused is able to raise a 
defence under s 59 of the Crimes Act if they are the parent of the child, or 
an adult acting „in the place of the parent‟.439 Prior to 21 June 2007, s 59 
allowed parents to use force against their children provided that such force 
was reasonable and for the purposes of correction.  Following 
considerable public and political debate, s 59 was amended to restrict the 
defence and, in particular, to prevent the use of force for the purposes of 
correction.  The processes involved with the amendment illustrate many of 
the limitations of the legal system identified as part of this thesis. 
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6.3 Section 59 prior to 21 June 2007 
 
Before 21 June 2007, s 59(1) of the Crimes Act (“the old s 59”) provided 
that: 
 
 Every parent of a child and … every person in the place of the parent of a 
child is justified in using force by way of correction towards the child, if the 
force used is reasonable in the circumstances.440 
 
The key elements to this section are the concepts of “parent”, “child”, 
“justified”, “force”, “correction” and “reasonable”.  In this section I will 
deconstruct each of these elements to show how they contributed to the 
law‟s operative closure and the entrenchment of existing power structures 
governing the lives of children. 
 
6.3.1 “Parent” 
 
The defence created by the old s 59 was available to parents and to those 
who were acting “in the place of the parent”. In R v Murphy441 for example, 
the Court held that a babysitter was entitled to use the s 59 defence.  
However, the old subsection 59(3) specifically provided that teachers were 
not acting „in the place of the parent‟ and that they were therefore bound 
by s 139A of the Education Act 1989 that prohibits the use of corporal 
punishment in educational institutions. This use of a self-referential 
process excluded teachers from using the old s 59 as a defence if they 
used force against a child (unless they were the child‟s parent).  
 
Restricting the protection offered by the old s 59 defence to parents 
indicates that the law considered the role of a parent to be unique in some 
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way.  This uniqueness appeared to rest solely on parental status.  If two 
adults used the same force against the same child for the same purposes 
of correction and only one of those adults was a parent of the child, only 
the parent was able to defend themselves on the basis of the old s 59.  
This distinction, based purely on parental status, indicates that the old s 59 
was concerned with the protection or maintenance of parental power, 
rather than with the impact of the use of force on the child concerned.  
 
The law has defended the appropriateness of maintaining parental power 
by using the conception that children are the objects of parental rights and 
that this is in the best interests of children.  This argument incorporates 
elements of long standing conceptions regarding children442 and of more 
recent interest-based rights theories.443  Both of these arguments were 
evident in B(R) v Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, a 
Canadian case considering the Canadian equivalent to the old s 59, where 
the Court found that:  
 
The common law has always, in the absence of demonstrated neglect or 
unsuitability, presumed that parents should make all significant choices 
affecting their children, and has afforded them a general liberty to do as 
they choose.  This liberty interest is not a parental right tantamount to a 
right of property in children … This role translates into a protected sphere 
of parental decision-making which is rooted in the presumption that 
parents should make important decisions affecting their children both 
because parents are more likely to appreciate the best interests of their 
children and because the state is ill-equipped to make such decisions 
itself. Moreover, individuals have a deep personal interest as parents in 
fostering the growth of their own children.
444
  
 
Reflecting these arguments, the old s 59 established a boundary between 
the public and private responsibility for children and left decisions 
regarding „reasonable‟ physical discipline to parents, rather than to the 
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state.  The section therefore operated to reinforce the legal system‟s 
operative closure and entrench parental power by excluding the 
jurisdiction of the courts over parent/child relationships and providing a 
justification for their exercise of power. 
 
6.3.2. “Child” 
 
Although some specific offences under the Crimes Act contain age 
restrictions,445 the defence provided by the old s 59, did not define the 
term “child”.446  Nor does the Crimes Act contain any general definition of 
the term. Consequently, when considering the application of the old s 59, 
the legal system was required to define whether the victim was a “child”, 
before considering the potential application of s 59 as a defence. The 
application of the defence was therefore subject to the law‟s power to 
produce its own knowledge by defining the status of victims as either 
children or adults.  This process is a further example of the legal system‟s 
functional requirement to reduce the complexity of human relationships 
into binary alternatives.  Furthermore, the definition process followed in 
cases such Ausage v Ausage447 demonstrates the role of autopoietic 
processes of self-reference in producing definitions of “child”. 
 
The Court in Ausage v Ausage448 had to determine whether the old s 59 
could be used by a father to defend his use of force against his 17-year-
old daughter.  The Court therefore had to decide whether the term “child” 
included 17-year-olds.  To reach its decision, the Court specifically 
referred to the provisions of the UNCRC, which define “child” to include 
young people up to and including 17 years of age.  This self-reference 
confirmed the closure of the legal system to the particular world of the 17-
year-old child as it was the provisions of the legal system itself that 
determined the outcome of the law‟s knowledge production process.   
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6.3.3 “Justified” 
 
The old s 59 explicitly provided a justification for parents to use force 
against their children.  Section 2 of the Crimes Act defines “justified” to 
mean “not guilty of an offence and not liable to any civil proceeding.”  This 
definition was particularly significant for the operation of the old s 59 as it 
extended the legal protection offered to parents beyond protection against 
criminal proceedings under the Crimes Act itself to include civil 
proceedings.  Consequently, the old s 59 was considered relevant in 
custody disputes,449 domestic violence proceedings450 and care and 
protection proceedings under the Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989.451 Some judges expressed surprise at the wide scope 
of the old s 59 defence. Fisher J in Sharma v Police commented that:  
 
 The first question is whether the defence of child discipline under s 59 … 
is available to a person (charged with breaching a protection order).  
Given the overriding objectives of the (Domestic Violence) Act I would 
have expected the answer to be No. Even in harmonious families, the 
issue of corporal punishment is controversial enough.  How much more 
dubious must it be where there is a protection order in force.
452
 
 
Despite his surprise at the wide scope of s 59, Fisher J found that he was 
bound to allow use of the defence, even outside the criminal jurisdiction. 
However, courts were sometimes reluctant to accept this apparently 
universal defence and could take a strict interpretative approach when 
considering the application of s 59 outside the criminal jurisdiction.  In 
Wilton v Hill453 for example, although acknowledging the relevance of the 
old s 59, the Court considered that the use of physical discipline by the 
father, even if it did not lead to criminal charges, was nevertheless a 
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relevant factor for the Court to consider in assessing the best interests of 
the children.454   
 
The wide scope of the justification provided by the old s 59 is arguably 
based on the conception that children are the objects of parental rights 
and responsibilities.455  Given that this conception focuses on parental 
rights, it was logically consistent for the defence constructed by the 
conception and codified in s 59 to apply whenever the law considered a 
parent‟s application of force against a child. Furthermore, the self-
referential processes of the legal system contributed to systemic closure 
by establishing the defence as a norm to be generally applied. 
 
6.3.4 “Force” 
 
The application of the old s 59 could be considered whenever a child was 
subject to the use of “force” by a parent.  Although the term “force” is not 
defined in the Crimes Act it is well defined at common law: to constitute a 
criminal act, the application of physical force must be intentional456 but 
does not necessarily need to involve violence457; the purpose of the force 
applied is also relevant as is the subjective response of the recipient (a 
kiss on the cheek may be acceptable in most cases but can constitute an 
illegal application of force if it is done against the will of the person being 
kissed)458; and the slightest degree of force is sufficient to constitute a 
criminal act.459  
 
The law‟s definition of “force” has therefore developed over time and is 
now encapsulated within legally accepted precedent. As previously noted, 
Teubner argues that although legal rules may initially represent underlying 
social values, over time they develop, through self-referential processes of 
production and maintenance, to exclude references to the social 
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environment altogether.460  This process is evident in the way in which a 
concept such as “force” is defined. When considering whether a particular 
action against a child constitutes a use of force, the legal system refers to 
its own definitions through the self-referential system of precedent, not 
exclusively to the subjective experience of that child. A recipient of 
unwanted force, whether an adult or a child, must be able to translate their 
subjective experience into a format acceptable to the legal system as a 
valid legal communication before they can receive any redress.  The way 
in which the legal system defined “force” therefore contributed to operative 
closure when the law considered the use of force for the purposes 
correction under the old s 59. 
 
6.3.5 “Correction” 
 
One of the most significant points to note regarding the old s 59 is that it 
justified the use of force for the purposes of “correction”. As explored in 
chapter 4, the law is able to use a number of conceptions of children to 
support the use of force for the purposes of correction.  The physical 
discipline of children has been supported by the apparently contradictory 
conceptions of childhood innocence and childhood corruption.  This 
indicates that support for the use of physical discipline may have more to 
do with attempting to exonerate adults from claims that they take 
advantage of their physical power over children than with a genuine 
concern for the healthy development of children.  By constructing children 
as innocent or as corrupt, adults and the law have been able to construct 
the use of physical force against children as a necessity for the protection 
or correction of the child victim.  
 
Conceptualising children as either corrupt or innocent also constructs 
differences between adults and children that operate to entrench the 
power differentials between them.  This entrenchment of adult power 
would be more difficult if alternative conceptions of children and childhood 
were adopted, such as choice-based rights conception that children are 
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rights-holders in their own right and entitled to exercise some agency over 
their own lives. Conceptions of childhood have therefore contributed to the 
legal system‟s operative closure and the entrenchment the power of 
parents over the lives of their children through legal norms such as the old 
s 59. 
 
6.3.6 “Reasonable” 
 
The old s 59‟s use of the term „reasonable‟ was an attempt to inject some 
objectivity into the legal construction of parental behaviour as legal or 
illegal.  However, as noted by Margaret Davies, legal claims to objectivity 
are questionable as objectivity is, at best, an impossible ideal given the 
inherent limitations of human decision makers.461  By excluding reference 
to the subjective nature of human decisions, claims of objectivity 
marginalize considerations of context and alternative constructions of 
reality. By doing so, they support the legal system‟s operative closure by 
contributing to the law‟s production of knowledge that meets the abstract 
and changing requirements of the legal system itself and those who hold 
power within that system.462  Consequently, despite its claim to objectivity, 
definitions of “reasonable” force have remained elusive.   
  
The elusive nature of „reasonable‟ force has been evident since the 
concept was incorporated into New Zealand legislation by the Children‟s 
Protection Act 1890.  As early as 1902 for example, the Court of Appeal 
held that defining the concept of „reasonable‟ punishment could not be 
approached as if  
 
the exact amount of punishment which is reasonable under the 
circumstances were capable of being mathematically estimated … such a 
matter is not open to mathematical determination, because the data are 
not mathematical.463 
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An examination of the historical application of the old s 59 and its 
predecessors clearly demonstrates the extent to which the definition of 
what constitutes „reasonable‟ force against children has been historically 
and politically constructed.464 Definitions of “reasonable force” have been 
particularly elusive because cases where the old s 59 has been available 
as a defence can be tried before a judge or a jury. As a general rule, juries 
were traditionally more prepared to accept a lower threshold of 
reasonableness than judges were.465  
 
Given the wide variance in outcomes arising from cases involving the old s 
59, the law used the concept of „reasonableness‟ to give itself the 
appearance of objectivity.  However, more recent cases have attempted to 
set some guidelines for determining the boundaries of „reasonable‟ force 
and thereby confirm the validity of the law‟s claim to objectivity. In Ausage 
v Ausage,466 for example, the Court listed a number of specific factors to 
be considered in determining whether an adult‟s force was „reasonable‟.  
These factors included the age and maturity of the child, specific 
characteristics of the child such as physique, sex, and state of health, the 
type of offence and the type and circumstances of punishment.467  These 
factors are revealing in themselves.  Why should the reasonableness of 
force depend on the sex or age of the child recipient?  The nature of these 
considerations confirms the extent to which the law produces its own 
knowledge about the world by reducing the complexity of human existence 
into a manageable form that can be listed into discrete facts.   By reducing 
complexity in this way, the law‟s attempts at objectivity contribute to 
operative closure through actively constructing a simplified world for the 
law to respond to.   
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6.3.7 Summary 
 
The law employed a number of conceptions of childhood to justify the 
existence of the old s 59.  In doing so, the legal system was able to reduce 
the complexity of relationships between parents and children to a more 
manageable level amenable to the law‟s systemic processes for resolving 
disputes. Such conceptions also supported and entrenched adult power 
over the lives of children.  The old s 59 therefore contributed to the legal 
system‟s operative closure and this was evident in the inconsistency of 
legal decisions delivered under the old s 59.468  However, as concern 
increased about the maltreatment of children in society and the 
inconsistent legal response under the old s 59, public and political 
attention turned to the operation of the section and this led its amendment 
in 2007.469  In the following section of this chapter I will argue that the 
reform process illustrates the autopoietic, closed nature of the legal 
system and the limited usefulness of Habermas‟ theory for understanding 
political processes. 
 
6.4 The law reform process. 
 
6.4.1 Autopoietic self-reference in action 
 
Given that the old s 59 entrenched the power of parents over children, the 
law reform process focused on the rights of children as a means to 
redistribute power to children.  This focus on the rights of children was 
evident in the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child‟s 
regular reports on New Zealand‟s compliance with the UNCRC.470  These 
reports, prepared following New Zealand‟s ratification of the UNCRC, 
criticized New Zealand for continuing to allow the use of corporal 
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punishment through the old s 59.471  The Committee strongly 
recommended in its reports that New Zealand “amend the law to prohibit 
corporal punishment within the family”472 and that the old s 59 should be 
repealed.  The operation of the old s 59 was also criticized by a number of 
legal and social commentators.473   
 
Many of these commentators, and the United Nations in its regular reports, 
based their arguments for the repeal of s 59, at least in part, on its 
inconsistency with the rights of children recognized in the UNCRC.474  In 
particular, article 19 of the UNCRC specifically provides that:  
 
 States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social 
and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or 
mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect of negligent treatment, 
maltreatment of exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of 
parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the 
child. 
 
Although article 19 is not framed as a “right”, but as a set of duties 
imposed on States Parties, the source of this duty is an acceptance that 
children have an interest-based right to be protected from maltreatment 
and that this imposes obligations on States Parties.475 
 
The use of references to legal rights such as the rights contained in the 
UNCRC476 as a justification for repealing the old s 59 is an example of the 
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self-referential nature of the legal system as identified by Luhman and 
Teubner.  This self-referential process structured the debate regarding the 
reform of s 59 by moving the debate‟s focus from the subjective needs of 
children, to competing and objective rights. As part of the law reform 
process, communications regarding the old s 59 were translated into “legal 
communications” that generated themselves through referring to the 
requirements of the legal system itself and were regulated by the 
requirements of legal process.477 These autopoietic, self-referential 
processes constructed children and adults as objectified rights-holders (a 
form of “semantic artefact”478) and this confirmed the legal system‟s 
operative closure. 
 
The legal system‟s process of translating children and adults into 
objectified rights-holders was evident in many of the parliamentary 
speeches regarding the old s 59.479  The following excerpts provide 
examples: 
 
 Judith Collins (National) claimed that the law change “gives people 
a right to say: „I can tell you what you do in your home.  I can be in 
charge of you in your home, because you as a parent have no 
greater right than a school teacher over your child.”480 
 
 Bill English (National) argued that the “ideological push to separate 
children and their rights from those of their families, in the context of 
people who care for them, has reached its high tide and is now 
receding” and referred to “the established right and care of a parent 
to discipline a child.”481 
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 Heather Roy (ACT) claimed that “[p]arents in this country want the 
right to be able to choose for themselves how they bring up their 
children.”482  
 
 Gerry Brownlee (National) argued that parents should be able to 
“exercise their right to ensure their children are brought up with 
some discipline in their life.”483  
 
All of these references illustrate how both adults and children were 
constructed as objectified semantic artifacts to which the legal system 
could respond by allocating rights. Consequently, the „thing‟ at stake in the 
debate became not children themselves but objective rights. It is this 
process of responding to objective constructions of reality rather than 
subjective realities that is the basis of operative closure.  The systemic 
requirements of the law as an autopoietic system, with its self-referential 
focus on rights-holders, therefore played a significant role in limiting the 
debate concerning s 59 and closing off the legal system from the 
subjective realities of children (and adults).   
 
The parliamentary debates regarding the old s 59 often focused on the 
rights of parents, rather than on the rights of children.  This focus on 
parental rights minimised the number of references in the debates to 
social science research findings regarding the efficacy or long-term effects 
of physical discipline. The exclusion of social science research is a feature 
predicted by Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories on the basis that such 
research, as discourse not amenable to being constructed into the stark 
legal/illegal dichotomy required by the legal system, cannot be referred to 
in legal discourse without significant translation.484  Furthermore, the 
emphasis on parental rights minimised the consideration of the rights of 
children.  Although the rights of children played a significant role in the 
arguments for reform presented by advocates for repeal of the section,485 
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such considerations were not a feature of the parliamentary debates 
regarding s 59.   
 
The focus on parental rights in the Parliamentary debates, rather than on 
the rights of children themselves, was another result of the self-referential 
nature of the legal system constructing the debate.  The legal system was 
required to respond to communications about the maltreatment of some 
children by their parents.  The primary tool at the legal system‟s disposal 
was the creation of a boundary between legal and illegal behaviour, a 
boundary established by the old s 59 in conjunction with other provisions 
of the Crimes Act.  By referring to this binary distinction, the legal system 
was able to translate the communications generated within the political 
system into a legally valid form.  This, in turn, dictated the structure of the 
law‟s self-productive response by restricting it to the establishment of a 
new boundary between legal and illegal conduct through the criminal law.  
However, as criminal law is one of the clearest examples of the use of 
state power to create norms and enforce compliance, the legal system‟s 
construction of the reform process within the criminal law context focused 
the debate concerning the repeal of s 59 on the exercise of power over 
children and whether that power should be exercised by the state or by 
parents.  
 
6.4.3 Operative closure 
 
The role of the political system in amending the old s 59 appears to 
contradict Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims that the legal system is 
operationally closed and unable to interact with other systems.486 The 
political system clearly interacted with the legal system throughout the law 
reform process for the old s 59. However, Luhmans‟ and Teubner‟s 
theories of operative closure are based on the thesis of informational or 
semantic closure, not closure to matter or energy from other systems such 
as the political system.487 Consequently, the apparent relationship 
between the legal and political system does not contradict Luhman‟s and 
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Teubner‟s theories.  Their theories of operative closure focus on the 
systemic requirements for producing knowledge through communication 
and argue that these processes are operatively closed.488   
 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories provide an explanation for the extent to 
which the political debate concerning the old s 59 was controlled by the 
legal system‟s functional requirements, particularly the requirement to 
reduce complexity through use of the legal/illegal dichotomy and focus on 
objectified rights. Complex family dynamics were reduced during the 
political debate to binary distinctions and objectified rights-holders and this 
resulted in the legal system producing abstract knowledge about the world 
and family relationships.  This abstract knowledge, in turn, led to operative 
closure of the legal system.  If Luhman and Teubner are correct, this 
operative closure will prevent the reform from being effective as a tool of 
social regulation because the norms created by the new law will be caught 
within the law‟s closed and abstract world.489  However, if Habermas is 
correct, this closure could be overcome if the new law is perceived to be a 
valid exercise of power through democratic processes. 
 
6.4.4 Power and validity 
 
The legal system‟s requirement to define a boundary between legal and 
illegal conduct emphasises its basis in state power, as it is the state‟s 
ability to enforce the distinction through the exercise of power and the 
imposition of punishment that gives the boundary its significance. Although 
moral arguments for and against corporal punishment could be potentially 
significant aspects of debates within the political or other social spheres, 
they had little impact during the law reform process for s 59.  The process 
was governed by the techniques of power.   
 
The legal system‟s foundation on techniques of power was particularly 
evident during the s 59 amendment process.  Although the process led to 
a change in the law, the change was not supported by a majority of the 
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voting population. Before the amending bill passed, opinion polls indicated 
that up to 85% of the voting public were opposed to the amendment or 
repeal of s 59.490 After the amendment was passed, surveys indicated that 
potentially 78% of parents would continue to smack their children when 
they considered it reasonable to do so for the purposes of correction.491 It 
therefore appears that the amendment did not enjoy the support of a 
potentially significant percentage of New Zealand‟s population at the time 
it was made. 
 
As examined in chapter three, Habermas argues that for the legal system 
to perform its function of maintaining social integration,492 it must be 
perceived to be valid.  This validity has both subjective and objective 
elements and is created through processes of „deliberative democracy‟.493 
Consequently, for law reform such as the amendment of s 59 to be valid, it 
must arise from social consensus generated through democratic 
processes.  Given the lack of general support for the amendment to s 59, 
it may not be perceived to be valid by a potentially significant part of New 
Zealand society and this may have an impact on its ability to influence 
behaviour. 
 
Even if the amended s 59 is not perceived to be valid, compliance with the 
law is still possible but, in Habermas‟ terms, such compliance will 
generally be strategic rather than performative compliance.494  Compliance 
with the new s 59 may be based on an appreciation of the consequences 
of non-compliance rather than on a belief in the validity of the legal norm 
itself.  Arguably, from the perspective of children who will be affected by 
the law change, compliance enough will be sufficient, regardless of 
whether such compliance is performative or merely strategic.  However, if 
Habermas is correct, the validity of the legal system as a whole is 
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weakened the more it relies on strategic compliance.  Furthermore, 
reliance on strategic compliance reveals the power that provides the 
“mystical foundation” of law‟s authority,495 as obtaining strategic 
compliance is dependent on the state‟s ability to use force against its 
citizens. 
 
To avoid excessive reliance on strategic compliance with the law, and the 
resulting loss of perceived legitimacy for the legal system, the state needs 
to work towards achieving performative compliance with all legislation, 
including the new s 59.  However, given that the legal system‟s operations 
are restricted to defining and enforcing the boundary between legality and 
illegality, there is little that the legal system itself is able to do to convert 
strategic compliance to performative compliance.  The state needs to 
employ other tools, public education for example, to achieve performative 
compliance.  The risk for the legal system with unpopular law reform such 
as the amendment of s 59, is that strategic compliance can be considered 
sufficient by political actors, particularly given the costs (both financial and 
political) of obtaining performative compliance, and this can ultimately 
destabilize the democratic process.  
 
6.4.5 The operations of democracy 
 
The debate concerning s 59 highlights some of the theoretical difficulties 
with Habermas‟ approach to democratic processes when considering the 
legal system‟s response to child maltreatment.  Although Habermas 
argues that the law‟s validity should be based on social consensus 
developed through the processes of deliberative democracy, in New 
Zealand, as in other Western democracies, it is the consensus of elected 
representatives that creates the law.  The link between legal validity and 
political reality is therefore somewhat haphazard, as individuals subject to 
the law cannot necessarily perceive themselves to be the rational authors 
of the law. As evidenced by the s 59 amendment process, representative 
democracy can create law which does not reflect the consensus of opinion 
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amongst those represented and yet it is the participation and consensus of 
all citizens affected by the law which, for Habermas, creates legal validity.   
 
If legal validity is dependent on a consensus of those affected, particular 
difficulties arise when the law responds to the interests of children given 
their exclusion from democratic processes. Sue Bradford specifically 
acknowledged this point during the Parliamentary debates concerning the 
amendment of the old s 59.  She pointed out that “… children should be at 
the centre of this debate … but sadly children‟s voices are not often heard 
in this place of power”496 and she argued against a referendum proposed 
by United Future on the basis that it would be just “another way in which 
children and young people are completely disenfranchised.”497  
 
The fact that children‟s voices were not heard during the amendment 
process for s 59 is a clear breach of article 12 of the UNCRC, which gives 
children who are capable of forming their own views a right to express 
those views freely in all matters that affecting them.  Given the link 
between rights and deliberative democracy identified by Habermas498 it is 
particularly significant that the right for children to participate in the s 59 
debates was not recognised. This normative requirement of the legal 
system was not communicated to the political system and is a further 
example of the inter-system communication difficulties that lead to 
operative closure.  
 
As previously noted, if Habermas‟ theory regarding the validity of the law is 
correct, it could be used as an argument against Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s 
theories of operative closure.499  However, the law reform process for the 
old s 59 indicate that democratic processes proceed on a representative 
basis, can rely on strategic rather than performative compliance, and that 
social differences (differences in social power, to use Derrida‟s 
definition500) operate to exclude children in particular from participating in 
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law reform processes.  All of these factors indicate that Habermas‟ theory 
offers more of an ideal description of the law, rather than a description of 
how the law actually operates.  In contrast, many of the features of the s 
59 debate were predictable using Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories of 
autopoietic, operative closure.  Although the new law is perhaps too new 
to be subject to final judgement, the influence of the new law to date 
indicates that it has had little influence.  This confirms Luhman‟s and 
Teubner‟s argument that the legal system, as a consequence of its 
operative closure, is limited in its ability to reform society. 
 
6.4.6 The influence of the new law 
 
On 21 June 2007 the old s 59 was replaced with an amended section that 
specifically excluded parental correction as a justification for the use of 
force against children.501  It could be argued that this amendment 
represented a significant response by the legal system to child 
maltreatment.502  However, if the law operates as a closed system, 
through autopoietic processes such as self-reference and self-production 
as I have argued in this chapter, the amendment simply represents an 
internal adjustment within the closed world of the legal system itself.   
 
This conclusion is supported by a review completed three months after the 
amendment came into effect, which found that the new law had had little, if 
any, practical impact on police activity relating to child maltreatment.503 
Even during the law reform process, the proponent of the bill 
acknowledged that the amendment would not change the “culture of 
violence against children in New Zealand” or change the fact that “many 
minor and technical assaults take place” in New Zealand each day without 
legal consequences arising.504  
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The fact that the amendment of s 59 appears to have had little practical 
effect, despite the significant public debate and political activity it 
generated, confirms the operative closure of the legal system and the 
restriction this places on its ability to respond to child maltreatment.  This 
operative closure was evident throughout the law reform process.  It arose 
from the system‟s functional requirement to construct an appropriate 
boundary between legal and illegal behaviour, from the limitations 
generated by normative conceptions of childhood, the role power 
dynamics played in constructing the discursive processes of reform and 
balancing competing rights and the objectifying nature of rights discourses 
in general. All of these factors played a part in constructing the debate to 
meet the semantic requirements of the legal system itself, rather than the 
needs of children who, when they were considered at all, became 
objectified as semantic artefacts.  
 
These arguments do not mean that the reform process was futile.  Sue 
Bradford argued that the repeal of s 59 would be “a small but necessary 
step towards beginning to turn … attitudes (accepting violence towards 
children) around.”505  Habermas‟ theories can be used to support this 
argument on the basis that the law reform process encouraged public 
debate and involvement in democratic processes of reform, both of which 
assist with constructing perceptions of legal validity and encouraging 
performative compliance when consensus is achieved.  Although the lack 
of social (as opposed to political) consensus regarding the amendment 
suggests that even these goals may not have been achieved by the s 59 
reform process, this may change over time as societal inertia gradually 
transforms strategic compliance into performative compliance.  However, 
this process is by no means inevitable and in the meantime the legal and 
political systems must manage the risks to ongoing validity associated with 
relying on strategic compliance with the law.  Furthermore the production 
of knowledge through the democratic processes excluded participation 
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from children, despite their right to be heard (a failure of the legal system 
to communicate its normative requirements).  
 
In this chapter I have argued that the process of law reform evident from 
the s 59 amendment process supports Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims 
that the law operates as a closed system. As a consequence of this 
closure, the amendment of the old s 59 has only achieved goals relevant 
to the legal system itself (complying with the UNCRC for example) but has 
not been able to communicate its norms in any effective way to society.  I 
have also shown that although Habermas‟ theory offers some useful 
concepts for understanding how law reform processes can be improved by 
encouraging debate and performative compliance, his theory ultimately 
fails to describe how the legal system operates or negate the operative 
closure proposed by Luhman and Teubner.  
 
This chapter has focused on the processes involved with the creation of 
law.  In the next chapter I will examine how the law is applied by 
examining some recent cases of child maltreatment.  I will argue that 
these cases also confirm Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims that the law 
operates as a closed system and is consequently limited in its ability to 
regulate society to protect children. 
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Chapter 7      Applying the Law 
 
7.1 Introduction. 
 
In chapter 6 I examined the processes surrounding the law‟s creation and 
argued that these processes operate autopoietically and consequently 
limit the law‟s ability to prevent child maltreatment through law reform. In 
this chapter I will examine some recent cases where the legal system was 
called upon to apply existing law.  These cases confirm that the systemic 
restraints that limit the effectiveness of law‟s creative processes also apply 
when the law is applied.  I will begin by examining the operation of the 
care and protection regime established under the Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (“the CYPTF Act”).  I will then 
examine the law‟s response to child maltreatment when the care and 
protection regime has not been invoked and children come before the 
legal system under the custody and access regime.  
 
7.2 The care and protection of children 
 
The CYPTF Act establishes a legal regime for the care and protection of 
children.  One of the CYPTF Act‟s objectives is to protect children from 
“harm, ill-treatment, abuse, neglect and deprivation”506 and to achieve this 
objective it gives wide powers to the Department of Child, Youth and 
Family Services (“CYFS”) and to the Family Court to intervene in the lives 
of children and their families.  
 
A full review and critique of the care and protection regime established by 
the CYPTF Act is beyond the scope of this chapter.507  I will therefore 
focus on how the law‟s ability to respond to the needs of children through 
the care and protection regime is limited by the nature of the legal system.  
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To do so, I will examine how the care and protection regime failed to 
protect Olympia Jetson and Saliel Aplin from their stepfather as these 
failures confirm and illustrate many of the limitations of the legal system 
identified in this thesis. 
 
7.2.1 The Aplin Report 
 
Olympia Jetson and Saliel Aplin were murdered by their step-father when 
they were 11 and 12 years old respectively.  The Office of the Children‟s 
Commissioner completed a detailed report on the state‟s involvement in 
Olympia and Saliel‟s lives (“the Aplin Report”).508  The Aplin Report noted 
that, in their short lives, Olympia and Saliel: 
 
1. Lived in ten homes; 
2. Attended six different schools; 
3. Lived in eight different towns or cities; 
4. Lived with their grandparents for two years after being removed 
from their mother‟s care; 
5. Lived apart from their younger sister for five years; 
6. Lived with their mother and two different partners, both of whom 
were violent; 
7. Lived in a house with up to ten children intermittently for four 
years; 
8. Were exposed to 12 recorded incidents of violence and at least 35 
violent incidents not reported; 
9. Alleged abuse on at least five occasions; 
10. Attended counselling intermittently since they were three and four 
years old; 
11. Were psychologically assessed by court order on at least two 
occasions; and 
12. Were monitored by CYFS nearly all of their lives.509 
 
These factors illustrate two points in particular.  Firstly, any attempt to 
respond to child maltreatment must adopt a holistic, „whole child‟510 
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approach. The maltreatment Olympia and Saliel suffered, maltreatment 
that culminated in their murders, occurred within a wider context that 
included significant issues of poverty, housing difficulties, transience, on-
going domestic violence and possibly sexual abuse.511  Their story 
highlights that responding to child maltreatment requires a wide-ranging 
response to a variety of social and individual factors.  However, such a 
wide-ranging response is beyond the power of the legal system which, due 
to its inherent systemic limitations, is only able to respond to individual 
situations and specific events. 
 
The second feature highlighted by the brief summary outlined above is 
that Olympia and Saliel were monitored by the legal system‟s care and 
protection processes (both through court ordered assessments and by 
CYFS) nearly all of their lives and yet, despite this monitoring, they were 
not only exposed to significant levels of violence and disruption throughout 
their lives but were ultimately murdered by their step-father.  The state‟s 
response to Saliel and Olympia‟s plight was clearly ineffective.   
 
7.2.2 Lost in translation 
 
The Aplin Report identified that the state‟s ineffective response was due to 
a number of factors including, in particular, poor practice within CYFS 
(attributable in part to inadequate resourcing and poor management) and 
a lack of sufficient communication between the various statutory and other 
entities that had involvement with the Aplin/Jetson family (including CYFS, 
the Police, schools and the professionals involved with the family at 
various stages).512  It is significant to note that these conclusions were 
almost a repeat of the conclusions of a report the Office of the Children‟s 
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Commissioner had prepared 3 years following the murder of James 
Whakaruru (“the Whakaruru Report”).513  That report concluded that: 
 
There ought to be fundamental and operational adherence to the care and 
protection legislation and clear, strong links between the policies and 
practices of other jurisdictions, so that in all matters the best interests of 
the child are of paramount concern.514 
 
Both the Aplin Report and the Whakaruru Report therefore highlight the 
importance of communication between systems such as the legal system 
and social services systems such as CYFS.  However, Luhman and 
Teubner both argue that social systems operate as systems of meaning 
and produce their own knowledge in order to meet their own systemic 
requirements and that once these systems become autopoietically closed, 
they are unable to communicate with other social systems.515  Their 
theories may therefore offer some explanation for the communication 
problems that contributed to the state‟s failure to protect Olympia and 
Saliel from their step-father.  Examining the way in which the legal system 
responded to Olypmia‟s and Saliel‟s allegations of abuse confirms that it 
generated its own communications in accordance with its own functional 
requirements and knowledge production processes and that this 
contributed to the communication difficulties identified in the Aplin Report. 
 
The Aplin Report and the criminal case against the step-father516 both 
examined the way in which the legal system dealt with allegations that the 
step-father had been violent towards both Olympia and Saliel throughout 
their lives. This violence occurred to such an extent that shortly before her 
murder Olympia recorded in her diary that “my father is going to kill me.”517  
However, for these allegations to be effective within the legal system, they 
had to be translated into legally valid communications.518  It was this 
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translation process that limited the legal system‟s ability to respond to 
Olympia and Saliel adequately because the realities of Olympia‟s and 
Saliel‟s situation were lost in the translation process. 
 
One translation difficulty arose from the systemic requirement, or at least 
preference for, a formal complaint.  Consequently, when Olympia and 
Saliel‟s mother withdrew the formal complaints she made,519 the legal 
system was left without a legally valid communication to respond to.  
Further difficulties arose from the evidentiary requirements for a valid legal 
communication.  Complaints that were made to the family doctor, for 
example, provided insufficient evidence to proceed with a formal legal 
process.520  On a more practical level, other complaints were not actioned 
because of a “failure of the statutory agencies to report and respond.”521   
 
These translation difficulties prevented the formation of valid legal 
communications and illustrate one of the most significant limitations on the 
legal system‟s ability to prevent maltreatment: the legal system responds; 
it is inherently reactive.  Without the generation of a legal communication 
on terms acceptable to the legal system itself, the legal system was 
unable to respond to Olympia‟s and Saliel‟s needs and exercise its power 
to protect them from their step-father. Furthermore, these translation 
difficulties not only limited the legal system‟s ability to receive 
communications from other systems but also limited the legal system‟s 
ability to communicate its norms to those other systems. 
 
As discussed in chapter five, legal rights, particularly participation rights, 
are designed to transfer power to children and enable them to participate 
in the creation of knowledge about their own lives.522  To complete this 
transfer of power, the legal system must be able to communicate its norms 
to other systems.  Olypmia and Saliel had a right under s 5(d) of the 
CYPTF Act to participate in any decision concerning the state‟s role in 
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their lives. This right should have empowered Olympia and Saliel to 
participate in generating legal communications to trigger the operation of 
legal power on their behalf.  However, it is clear from the Aplin Report that 
the establishment of a legal right for Olympia and Saliel to participate in 
the production of knowledge about their lives was not communicated to 
the other social systems that were involved in Olympia‟s and Saliel‟s lives.   
 
Although Olympia and Saliel both had the right to express their views, 
there were only five records of the social workers involved with their family 
actually talking directly to them.523  Consequently, the social workers 
related almost exclusively to the adults in the family and this, in turn, had a 
significant impact on their ability to “objectively consider the risks the 
children faced in an environment of ongoing domestic violence and 
abuse”.524  The existence of the legal right of participation may have been 
known to these social workers, but it was not communicated at a systemic 
level to alter their behaviour or the requirements of the social service 
systems they operated within.   
 
7.2.3 Enforcing legal norms 
 
The failure of the social workers involved with Olympia and Saliel to 
recognise their right to participate in the production of knowledge about 
their lives highlights a major consequence of the law‟s operative closure; 
creating the law achieves little, it requires implementation in practice to be 
effective.525  Attempts to use the legal system to protect children from 
maltreatment therefore need to recognise that the law‟s effectiveness is 
dependent upon the activities of other systems to recognise and enforce 
the law‟s normative standards.  However, these other systems operate 
within their own systemic restraints and struggle to receive and implement 
communications from the legal system.  This ultimately restricts the legal 
system‟s ability to respond to child maltreatment and protect children such 
as Olympia and Saliel. 
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7.2.4 Power produces knowledge 
 
As noted in chapter four, one of the ways in which the law produces 
knowledge about the world is by using the conception that children are the 
objects of parental rights and responsibilities. The CYPTF Act develops 
this traditional conception by locating the primary responsibility for the care 
and protection of children within their family group, rather than their 
parents alone. The CYPTF Act incorporates a wide definition of the term 
“family” that includes whanau, hapu and iwi or any culturally recognised 
family group or any extended family where the child has psychological 
attachment to at least one of the adults in the group.526 To recognise the 
rights and responsibilities of the family group to care for and protect 
children, the CYPTF Act established the Family Group Conference as the 
primary mechanism for resolving care and protection issues.527   
 
By locating responsibility for the care of protection of children primarily 
within the family group, the law gives to such family groups the power to 
produce knowledge about children that can form the basis of valid legal 
communications within the legal system itself.  This empowerment of 
family groups, rather than children alone, has significant implications for 
the way in which knowledge is produced within and outside the legal 
system.  However, the CYPTF Act also empowers social workers and 
other professionals to contribute to the production of knowledge about 
children. 
 
The Aplin Report specifically considered the way in which social workers 
produced knowledge about Olympia and Saliel.  The writers of the Aplin 
Report argued that the social workers involved with Olympia and Saliel 
placed too much emphasis on forming and maintaining relationships with 
the family at the expense of a careful analysis of the child‟s situation.528  
Consequently, the knowledge that was produced about Olympia‟s and 
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Saliel‟s lives failed to incorporate their subjective experiences or 
perspectives and only reflected the views of the adults who held power 
over their lives.   It is difficult to determine whether this was an unforseen 
consequence of the importance given to family relationships within the Act 
or the result of the psychological and human dynamics that arise between 
social workers and those they encounter when carrying out their duties.  
Whatever the cause, it is clear that the legal system‟s ability to respond to 
child maltreatment can be restricted by a focus on the adult relationships 
surrounding children at risk, a focus supported by the conceptions of 
childhood used to justify the law itself.529 This limitation contributes to the 
operative closure of the legal system by allowing the legal system to 
produce knowledge about the world that serves the interests of power, 
rather than the interests of children themselves. 
 
7.2.5 Summary 
 
The Aplin Report is harrowing reading.  Olympia Jetson and Saliel Aplin 
were subjected to violence and abuse throughout their lives, culminating in 
their murder at the hands of their stepfather.530  They suffered despite the 
care and protection regime established by the Act.  Although the Aplin 
Report did not raise any particular concerns about the care and protection 
regime established under the CYPTF Act, it did raise significant concerns 
about the implementation of that regime and the communication failures 
that restricted the ability of the various state systems from responding 
adequately to Olypmia‟s and Saliel‟s needs. These concerns confirm that 
the care and protection regime established under the CYPTF Act is 
operationally closed and consequently limited in its ability to protect 
children from maltreatment.  The regime cannot communicate its norms to 
other systems and can only act reactively to impose consequences rather 
than proactively to address systemic causes of maltreatment.  These 
limitations are exacerbated by the difficulties of communicating between 
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social systems and the legal system‟s own requirements for producing 
legally valid communications.  All of these limitations confirm Luhman‟s 
and Teubner‟s claims that the legal system is operationally closed and 
consequently unable to regulate society.  In the next section I will review 
the case of PCN v JCF531 (“PCN”), to determine whether operative closure 
is evident in another area where the law is often required to respond to 
child maltreatment; custody and access. 
 
7.3 Custody and access - PCN 
 
PCN is a case that involved custody and access applications within the 
context of a violent family.  It illustrates a number of difficulties with the 
legal system‟s ability to respond when children live within a violent 
environment. In particular, PCN illustrates the power that the law has to 
produce its own knowledge about children and how this power leads to 
operative closure. 
 
7.3.1 The facts of PCN 
 
The decision in PCN arose from custody applications made by the mother 
and father of two children (an 11-year-old boy and a 6-year-old girl) and 
was decided in 2005. The children who were the subjects of the case had 
been living with their father since 2003, although their mother had not 
given consent to this custody arrangement. Although the mother had 
originally been granted custody, the father had removed both children from 
her care in 2003.  The mother stated that she did not resist the father‟s 
removal of the children in 2003 or apply for custody until 2005 because 
she was “too afraid” of the father.532 
 
The father initially applied for interim and final custody orders in July 2003 
but he did not bring to the Family Court‟s attention at that time the facts 
that the mother already had a final custody order or that he was uncertain 
whether a final protection order had been granted against him. Nor did he 
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advise the Court that his supervised access order had been suspended in 
2000 after he had seriously assaulted the mother.  The Court eventually 
considered the father‟s application and the mother‟s response in March 
and April 2005. 
 
The Court found that the father had used sustained and serious violence 
against the mother throughout their relationship.  The father had used this 
violence to control the mother and it had damaged her physically, 
emotionally and psychologically.533  His violence included an attempt to 
run the mother over with a car; an attempt that led to a six-month prison 
sentence.534  Significantly, the children were in the car with the father 
when he attempted to run over their mother.  
 
Various reports concerning the children were prepared throughout 2004.  
On the basis of these reports, the Court found that the children had 
suffered “considerable psychological and emotional harm” as a result of 
witnessing the violence their father inflicted on their mother.535  One report, 
stated that the son appeared “to be stuck in a pattern of fear and worry as 
a result of what he has experienced” and that he was “experiencing 
traumatic memories from the past … accompanied by fear or anxiety at a 
level that is disturbing or aversive.”536 
 
The father described the violence in the relationship as equal.537  Although 
he admitted that he had acted violently towards the mother he did not 
accept the level of violence the mother alleged, despite his three criminal 
convictions for assaulting her.  In contrast, the mother described the way 
in which the father used his violence to exercise power and control over 
her life.  She believed the father would kill her.538 
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Overall, the Court found that the evidence was  
 
overwhelming that the violence used by Mr N against Ms F was serious.  
It was cruel, harsh and brutal without regard to the consequences for Ms 
F.539   
 
Furthermore, the Court found that although the children had not been the 
victims of physical violence directed against them, they had been 
significantly affected by the violence between their parents.   
 
In PCN, the legal system was required to respond to the needs of two 
children living within a context of significant family violence.  Examining 
how the law responded confirms that the law generally produces its own 
knowledge about the world and consequently operates as a closed 
system.  However, the case also indicates that family law in particular 
attempts to overcome this operative closure by actively incorporating 
communications from other social systems.  Both of these elements are 
evident in the way in which the law produced knowledge about the lives of 
the children involved in PCN by defining whether they were victims of 
abuse. 
 
The custody applications in PCN were made in 2003 and the definitions of 
abuse and the consequences of that definition established by s 16B of the 
Guardianship Act 1968 therefore applied. Although the Guardianship Act 
1968 has now been replaced by the Care of Children Act 2004, the 
provisions of s 16B were repeated in ss 58 to 61 of the Care of Children 
Act 2004 and the issues arising from PCN therefore continue to be 
relevant.540  I will therefore consider the operation of 16B in PCN in detail 
to illustrate how the application of the law contained in s 16B confirms the 
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operative closure of the legal system.  I will focus particularly on the 
operation of sections 16B(4) and (5). 
 
7.3.2 Section 16B(4) 
 
Section 16B(4) of the Guardianship Act 1968 provided: 
 
Where, in any proceedings to which this section applies, the Court is 
satisfied that a party to the proceedings (in this section referred to as the 
violent party) has used violence against the child or a child of the family or 
against the other party to the proceedings, the Court shall not –  
(a)  make any order giving the violent party custody of the child 
to whom the proceedings relate; or 
(b)  make any order allowing the violent party access (other 
than supervised access) to that child, 
 
 unless the Court is satisfied that the child will be safe while the violent 
party has custody of or, as the case may be, access to the child 
[emphasis added].  
 
I will consider two significant aspects of this section.  The first is that the 
section reflects a wide definition of child abuse by applying not only when 
a child is the recipient of violence themselves, but also when violence has 
been used against other family members.  The second aspect I will 
consider is the nature and effect of the jurisdictional barrier to custody or 
access created by the words I have emphasised in the section. 
 
7.3.3 Defining child abuse 
 
Through its power to construct and apply definitions, the law produces 
knowledge about the world.541  In custody cases such as PCN, the law 
exercises this power to define the nature of adult behaviour and its effect 
on children.  Traditionally, the law‟s approach was to consider the impact 
of family violence on children only if they had been the recipients of 
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violence or abuse themselves.542  However, there is increasing evidence 
that children are significantly affected by observing, hearing and being 
aware of the violence inflicted on members of their family and that children 
raised within violent homes face an increased risk of becoming victims of 
violence themselves.543  
 
The risk that spousal violence will be detrimental for children, both in terms 
of emotional and psychological harm and in terms of an increased risk of 
physical maltreatment, has led the legal system in New Zealand to expand 
its definitions of abuse. These expanded definitions of abuse have allowed 
the law to produce knowledge about children that takes account of broader 
contextual issues. Consequently, definitions of abuse in legislation such as 
the Domestic Violence Act 1995,544 the Care of Children Act 2004545 and s 
16B(4) of the Guardianship Act 1968 all define abuse to include both 
actions directed towards children and actions that create an unhealthy, 
violent environment for children.  Section 16B(4) of the Guardianship Act 
used this definition by restricting custody and access rights for adults who 
“used violence against the child or a child of the family or against the other 
party to the proceedings” [emphasis added].546  
 
The Court in PCN accepted that the children had been “emotionally and 
psychologically harmed by witnessing family violence between their 
parents.”547  The wider, contextual understanding of abuse incorporated 
into s 16B(4) therefore structured the Court‟s response to protect the 
children from the effects of their father‟s violence against their mother.  
However, the Court was still able to employ conceptions of childhood to 
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discount the effects of the father‟s use of force against the children 
themselves. 
 
No evidence was presented in PCN that the father had caused any 
physical harm to either child.548  However, the father acknowledged that 
he had been “quite hard” on his son and would “boot his bum‟ or smack 
him on the bum with open hands.”549  He would also smack his daughter. 
The father defended this behaviour on the basis that it was parental 
discipline.  The Court appeared to accept this claim as it simply noted that 
the father‟s actions were “in the context of discipline.”550  However, it must 
be borne in mind that the father‟s use of physical force for disciplinary 
purposes occurred within a family context that included extreme physical 
violence towards the mother, violence that the children had witnessed and 
that had been used as a tool of power and control.  This context could 
have had an impact on how the children subjectively experienced their 
father‟s use of physical discipline.  Although the father may have intended 
his use of force against the children as simple discipline, it is not clear that 
the children experienced his use of force in such a de-contextualised way. 
However, because the father was able to raise „parental discipline‟ as a 
defence for his applications of physical force against the children, the 
children‟s subjective experiences of that force were overlooked.  
Consequently, the knowledge the law produced about the children 
confirmed the legal system‟s operational closure from the realities of their 
lives. 
 
Although the Court was able to disregard the father‟s use of force against 
his children by employing conceptions of childhood and parental rights of 
discipline, it was bound to follow the processes set out in s 16B once it 
had determined that the father had used violence against the mother.  
These processes established a jurisdictional barrier restricting the options 
available to the Court and confirm the self-referential nature of the legal 
system‟s response. 
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7.3.4 The jurisdictional barrier 
 
Through use of the word obligatory words “shall not … unless”,551 s 16B(4) 
established a jurisdictional barrier for legal decision-making.552  If a Court 
was satisfied that violence had occurred, it had no discretion but was 
obliged to make decisions regarding the safety of the child or children 
involved before making any decision regarding custody or access. Unless 
a Court could be satisfied that granting the violent applicant custody or 
access would be safe, it was jurisdictionally unable to grant the violent 
party anything other than supervised access.   
 
The jurisdictional barrier established by s 16B(4) was designed to remove 
the inconsistencies that could arise as a result of different judges applying 
differing conceptions of childhood when applying the law, particularly the 
conception that parents‟ rights over „their‟ children include a right of 
access. This conception is obvious in critiques of s 16B such as that 
offered by Doogue J, who argues that the section could result in an 
“unacceptable disenfranchisement” of parents.553  Section 16B therefore 
attempted to reduce the possibility for inconsistency by prioritising the 
rights of children to safety over the rights of their parents to have contact. 
 
Section 16B‟s goal of securing a consistent application through the 
establishment of a jurisdictional barrier was specifically referred to in Blom 
v MacKay554 where Heath J stated: 
 
It is not for this Court to express any view as to the preferable policy 
approach. The role of this Court, as a Court exercising appellate 
jurisdiction from the Family Court, is to interpret the legislation passed by 
Parliament with a view to ensuring consistent application of that legislation 
in like cases.555 
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The goal of consistency reflects the arguments of Habermas,556 Luhman 
and Teubner557 that the function of the law is to stabilize divergent 
behavioural expectations.  Habermas argues that it does so by generating 
mutual understanding558 whereas Luhman and Teubner claim that the law 
achieves this goal by reducing complexity with binary alternatives, 
primarily the legal/illegal binary.559 Section 16B(4) does not support 
Habermas‟ arguments as the section did not establish, or arise from, a 
process designed to generate mutual understanding.  However, it supports 
Teubner‟s claim because, through using its power to define behaviour as 
either legal or illegal violence, the law was able to establish a binary 
alternative and reduce complexity into a form amenable to resolution 
through the legal process.  
 
7.3.5 Operative closure 
 
Section 16B(4) incorporated an expanded understanding of child abuse 
that took account of abuse within the wider family context and established 
a jurisdictional barrier for granting custody or access when such abuse 
had occurred.  By doing so s 16B(4) appeared to have been able to 
overcome systemic closure, at least to some extent, and incorporate the 
insights of research developed in and communicated from other social 
systems. The law‟s ability to incorporate such research findings from the 
social sciences in s 16B therefore appears to be a counter-argument to 
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s claims that the legal system is operationally 
closed and cannot receive communications from other discursive systems.   
 
However, Luhman and Teubner do not argue that communications to a 
closed legal system are impossible but that such communications can only 
influence the legal system indirectly through a process of reconstruction 
whereby the legal system „translates‟ the external communication into a 
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legally valid form.560  Examining how s 16B of the Guardianship Act 1968 
was applied in PCN supports this argument. 
 
Given the Court‟s findings that the father had used serious and sustained 
violence against the mother it was clear that the requirements of 
subsection 16B(4) had been satisfied.  Consequently, the Court could not 
give the father anything other than supervised access unless satisfied that 
the children would be safe in his care. 
 
Although s 16B itself focused on the safety of children, the legal system‟s 
functional requirements led to a focus on the nature of adult (and, in 
particular, parental) relationships, rather than on the children themselves.  
In practical terms, the legal system‟s functional requirement was to grant 
custody to one of the two parents thereby stabilising their behavioural 
expectations.  This functional requirement not only reflected the 
conception that children are the objects of the private rights and 
responsibilities of their parents but also the legal system‟s processes of 
reducing complexity with binary alternatives.  Consequently, the decision 
in PCN devoted significant attention to the nature of the relationship 
between the father and the mother and the violence the mother had 
suffered.  When reading the case, it is easy to overlook the fact that it is a 
case requiring a decision to be made concerning the interests of two 
children, and that it was the considerable “psychological and emotional 
harm”561 the children were suffering as a consequence of their living 
arrangements that the legal system was required to respond to.  Despite 
the maltreatment the children suffered, the focus of the case was on the 
nature of the relationship between their parents. 
 
Concepts of family autonomy and private parental responsibility also 
prevented the legal system from acting proactively to protect the children.  
The entire system of custody and access562 of which s 16B was a part 
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restricted the legal system‟s response to a reactive decision between the 
mother and the father, as applicants, rather than a proactive consideration 
of what was best in all the circumstances for the children.  This restriction 
of the legal system‟s response contributed to the legal system‟s 
construction of the process as a competition between the two parents.  
 
Although many cases claim that the legal system‟s role in custody 
disputes is to focus on and act in the best interests of children,563 PCN 
indicates that the limitations of the legal system operate to focus legal 
processes on the relationship of parents rather than on the interests of 
children.  In PCN, the legal system operated in a reactive, dichotomising 
way, forcing the decision concerning the responsibility for looking after the 
children into a contest between the two parents.  In doing so, wider 
contextual issues were excluded from consideration. Issues such as 
poverty or socially systemic issues of oppression impacting on the future 
welfare of the children were beyond the scope of the legal system‟s 
investigations.  
 
In summary, s 16B(4) incorporates communications from social science 
research establishing the significant impact that family violence can have 
on the welfare of children.  However, when translated into the legal 
system, these communications have not led to an increasing focus on the 
interests of children, but have re-distributed power between their parents.  
The legal system‟s response to children living within violent families 
continues to be constructed by the functional requirements of the legal 
system to establish binary alternatives and produce knowledge relevant to 
making a decision between those alternatives.  This confirms operative 
closure by excluding a consideration of the wide range of other factors that 
have an impact on the lives of children.  Similar issues arose in PCN with 
the application of s 16B(5) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
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7.3.6 Section 16B(5) 
 
Section 16B(5) provided that: 
 
In considering … whether or not a child will be safe while a violent party 
has custody of, or access (other than supervised access) to, the child, 
the Court shall, so far as is practicable, have regard to … the wishes of 
the child, if the child is able to express them, and having regard to the 
age and maturity of the child. 
 
Section 16B(5) therefore allowed the Court in PCN to have regard to the 
wishes of the children when considering whether the children would be 
safe while in their father‟s custody or during periods of access. 
 
7.3.7 The children‟s wishes 
 
The decision in PCN is particularly significant for the way in which the 
Court dealt with the children‟s wishes. Initially, the older child refused to 
disclose his wishes.  When he was interviewed by the Court appointed 
psychologist, he specifically asked whether his father knew about the 
interview.564 He was only willing to say that “he would be more worried if 
the Court granted custody to his mother, not for himself, but for his 
parents.”565 However, between the first and second interview, a period 
during which both children spent time with their father, he had changed his 
mind.  During the second interview he stated that “he wanted to stay living 
with his father and have contact with his mother on the weekends.”566  The 
Court did not consider the influence either parent may have been able to 
exert during the period between the two interviews.  The daughter, who 
was too young to recall most of the violence that had occurred between 
her parents, stated in both interviews that she wanted to remain with her 
father.   
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The psychologist appointed by the Court to interview the children stated in 
her report that:  
 
 The domestic violence had a very strong overlay on the children‟s 
attachments and wishes and … an overriding consideration for them was 
wanting to keep things safe for their mother, their father and themselves.  
The children‟s wishes could not be considered without fully seeing the 
effects of the violence on them and their attitude … one should be very 
cautious about interpreting the children‟s wishes and she would give them 
less weight.567 
 
I will examine two particular aspects of the part that the children‟s wishes 
played in PCN that illustrate limitations in the law‟s response to children; 
the first relates to the way in which the law produces knowledge about 
children by interpreting the wishes they express and the second is the 
problem of enforcement highlighted by my consideration of the Aplin 
Report.568  
 
7.3.8 Producing knowledge by interpreting wishes 
 
As discussed in chapter four, the law has creative power to produce 
knowledge about the world.569  This power arises because the meaning of 
language is dependent upon context and the intentions of the speaker.  
Consequently, sociologists refer to the „action orientation‟ model of 
language570 to describe the way in which people use language to achieve 
particular goals. In contrast, the law has traditionally operated on the basis 
of the „correspondence model‟ of language and assumed that language 
accurately reflects a discernible reality.571  Using this model of language 
can contribute to operative closure and this is evident in the way in which 
the Court in PCN interpreted the children‟s wishes. 
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It was clear to the Court appointed psychologist that although the children 
expressed a wish to remain with their father, their wishes could only be 
understood within the context of violence and fear existing within their 
fractured family unit.  The psychologist therefore considered that the 
children‟s wishes should not be interpreted literally but functionally, as 
language designed to achieve a particular goal, being safety for all 
members of the family. The psychologist therefore employed the action 
orientation model of language to recognise the significance of the context 
in which the children‟s wishes were expressed: the violence the children 
had witnessed and the use of that violence to control, the influence of the 
father between the two interviews, and the father‟s treatment of the 
children.   
 
Although the Court in PCN did not examine the children‟s wishes in great 
detail, it was prepared to take their wishes into account and for that reason 
the access given to the father was “more extensive than what might 
otherwise have been considered appropriate.”572  This indicates that the 
Court simply employed the legal system‟s traditional technique of 
constructing the wishes of the children to correspond with the literal 
meaning of their statements.  By doing so, it separated the meaning of 
those statements from the contexts in which they were made.  This result 
illustrates how the law, by employing its own discursive tools for producing 
knowledge about the world produces a version of the world that is 
separate and distinct from the world as subjectively experienced.  This 
separation of the world of the law and the world of subjective experience is 
a significant aspect of operative closure. 
 
7.3.9 Enforcing the law 
 
The Aplin Report I referred to previously in this chapter573 highlighted that 
creating a law achieves little; the legal system‟s ability to use its norm 
creating power to protect children is dependent upon effective 
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enforcement and implementation.574  Similar issues arose in PCN as the 
Court used the children‟s wishes in a way not provided for in s 16B(5). 
 
Section 16B(5) provided that the wishes of children would only be relevant 
to the question of their safety.  As previously noted, s 16B(4) provided that 
if a parent had been violent, they could not have any contact with their 
children (other than supervised access) unless the Court was satisfied that 
the children would be safe.  By restricting the children‟s right to participate 
to an ability to participate in the decision about safety only, s 16B(5) 
prioritised the interest-based rights of children over the choice-based 
rights of children and conceptualised children as particularly vulnerable to 
manipulation in situations of domestic violence. This conception is 
supported by significant social science research and reflected in law 
reform documents such as Sir Ronald Davison‟s inquiry following the 
deaths of the Bristol children.575  The restricted nature of the participation 
rights granted by s 16B(5) was therefore an attempt to incorporate 
communications from social science research into the legal system. 
 
However, despite the restricted nature of s 16B(5)‟s participation rights, 
the Court in PCN took the children‟s wishes into account to determine 
whether access should be granted, not simply to the determination of 
whether they would be safe if it was granted.  The children‟s wishes 
recorded in the judgment do not refer to the question of their safety at all 
and yet their wishes led the Court to grant their father more extensive 
access rights than it would otherwise have considered appropriate.576  
 
The fact that the children‟s wishes played a role in determining the final 
outcome, not just determining the issue of safety, indicates that even if 
operative closure can be overcome to allow social science research to be 
incorporated into the law, the effectiveness of the law is still dependent 
upon the law being applied in accordance with its terms.  This was 
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particularly significant in PCN because of the way in which the operative 
closure of the legal system led the Court to construct the wishes of the 
children in such a literal way.  This literal interpretation combined with the 
Court‟s failure to apply s 16B(5) in accordance with its own terms and led 
to a violent father being granted access rights that even the Court 
considered to be more extensive than it would generally consider 
appropriate.577 
 
7.3.10 Self-reference 
 
The formal structure of s 16B(5) also played a part in constructing the 
approach of the Court in PCN.  In addition to allowing the Court to take 
account of the children‟s wishes, the subsection included a list of factors 
for consideration by the Court, including factors such as the nature and 
seriousness of the violence used, how recently the violence had occurred, 
the frequency of the violence and the likelihood of further violence 
occurring.  These factors structured the Court‟s response by providing the 
framework for the Court to use in producing its knowledge about the world 
of the applicants and their children.  The Court considered each of the 
factors listed in the s 16B(5) in turn.  
 
The way in which the law structured the Court‟s approach and its 
production of knowledge illustrates the self-referential nature of legal 
processes identified by Luhman and Teubner.578  This structured response 
performs a number of significant functions within the legal system.  It 
reduces inconsistencies in the application of the law and thereby stabilises 
behavioural expectations.  It also allows the law the to reduce human 
complexity into a more manageable form.  However, a structured 
response is less able to respond adequately to unique and particular 
circumstances.  Derrida describes this conflict between establishing 
universal norms and responding adequately to individual circumstances as 
one of the contradictions central to the operation of the legal system.  
Recognising the existence of this contradiction confirms Derrida‟s 
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argument that the legal system‟s authority is ultimately founded on force 
and dependent upon the threat (and availability) of force for its continued 
validity.579   
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 
PCN confirms that the legal system‟s functional requirements operate to 
restrict its ability to respond to the needs of maltreated children when 
adults dispute questions of custody and access.  The functional 
requirement for binary alternatives restricts the legal system to responding 
reactively and choosing between, generally, two alternatives.580  This can 
lead the legal system to focus on the relationships of adults, rather than on 
the interests of children as occurred in PCN.  Secondly, although the legal 
system increasingly attempts to incorporate the insights of the social 
sciences when creating the law, these attempts can fail as a consequence 
of the legal system‟s operative closure.  Although attempts to incorporate 
the recommendations of the social sciences led to the introduction of s 
16B, PCN indicates that the requirements of the section, the jurisdictional 
hurdle in particular, can be disregarded or reinterpreted when the section 
is actually applied.  Furthermore, by using its own models of language and 
rights to interpret the wishes of children, the law can overlook alternative 
interpretations and an appreciation for the context dependent and 
purposive nature of communication.  All of these factors contribute to the 
legal system‟s operative closure and restrict its ability to respond to the 
subjectively experienced needs of children living within violent families. 
 
Given these restrictions on the law‟s ability to respond to the needs of 
children, it is not surprising that the Court in PCN ultimately found itself 
relying on hope.  Johnstone J concluded the judgment by stating: 
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 Supra at 24.  
580
 Other alternatives only arise when other parties, grandparents for example, also make 
applications for custody and/or access. 
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 I hope for the children‟s sake that Mr N will not revert to his former ways 
when the children cease to be in his primary care.581 
 
It is disappointing, but given the restrictions outlined in this thesis 
unsurprising, that despite the effort expended by the legal system to try 
and protect the children in PCN the Court found itself having to rely on 
hope that the father would not return to violence.  
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 Supra n 531 at 645. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I have used the systems theories of Luhman and Teubner to 
argue that the law is limited in its ability to protect children from 
maltreatment because the legal system creates and responds to its own 
world, rather than the world as experienced by human beings. The world 
of the law may approximate the world as subjectively experienced, but is 
in fact an abstraction that often overlooks, ignores or reconstructs that 
subjective world.  This process of abstraction arises from the law‟s 
functional requirements that require the law to reduce the chaotic 
complexity of human existence into binary alternatives.  These reductive 
processes limit the way in which the law produces its knowledge about the 
world and control how power is distributed within the world the law 
creates.  Most significantly, operative closure limits the law‟s ability to 
reform society and proactively address social problems such as child 
maltreatment.  
 
I have also examined Habermas‟s theories, which offer an alternative and 
more optimistic description of the relationship between law and society.  
He argues that knowledge is created through a process he describes as 
„communicative action‟ and that this process is the foundation of modern 
democracy and the law‟s legitimacy.  Habermas therefore argues that the 
knowledge the law produces is the result of communicative action, not the 
result of the law‟s operative closure.  Consequently, he argues that the law 
is able to regulate society because it is not an operationally closed system 
but, through its genesis in the participatory processes of modern 
democracy, exists in a symbiotic relationship with society. However, I have 
argued that Habermas‟ theory offers an idealised vision of the relationship 
between law and society, and that, in practice, the law is often created and 
applied without using processes of communicative action.  At most, the 
ideals Habermas proposes offer useful guidance for law reform processes 
by emphasising the importance of obtaining general consensus for law 
reform efforts. 
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One of the ways in which the law produces its knowledge about children is 
by using conceptions of childhood. I have argued that the law is engaged 
in an exercise of power when it creates its own world using such 
conceptions.  These conceptions contribute to the law‟s operative closure 
by constructing an abstract vision of the world based on normative, binary 
distinctions.  Furthermore, the knowledge the law produces generally 
serves the needs of the legal system itself, not the needs of children.  
Luhman‟s and Teubner‟s theories predict these results as the exclusion of 
children from the law‟s knowledge creation process is concomitant with 
operative closure.  Advocates for children have attempted to overcome the 
exclusion of children from the law‟s processes of knowledge creation by 
advocating for a redistribution of social power through the grant of rights.  
 
Granting rights to children is therefore an attempt to redistribute power to 
them in order to give them some power to participate in the production of 
knowledge about their lives.  However, the effectiveness of legal rights as 
a mechanism for redistributing power is entirely dependent on the law‟s 
ability to communicate and enforce this transfer of power outside the world 
of the law.  I have argued that the operative closure of the legal system 
can limit the effectiveness of rights as a tool for transferring power.  My 
analysis of the way in which law reform processes operate and the way in 
which the law is applied have both confirmed these limits of legal 
intervention. 
 
I examined law reform processes by examining the recent amendment to s 
59 of the Crimes Act 1961.  The legal system‟s operative closure was 
evident throughout the law reform process.  It arose from the system‟s 
functional requirement to construct an appropriate boundary between legal 
and illegal behaviour, from the limitations generated by normative 
conceptions of childhood, the role power dynamics played in constructing 
the discursive processes of reform and balancing competing rights and the 
objectifying nature of rights discourses in general. All of these factors 
played a part in constructing the debate to meet the autopoietic, self-
referential requirements of the legal system itself, rather than the needs of 
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children who, when they were considered at all, became objectified as 
semantic artefacts. The operative closure of the legal system resulted in a 
law reform process that generated significant debate but that appears to 
have had little impact on child maltreatment.  
 
My examination of the Aplin Report confirmed that the legal system‟s 
operative closure also has significant implications when the law is applied.  
The Aplin Report highlighted the communication difficulties that arise from 
operative closure and the gulf that can exist between the normative 
requirements of the law and the way in which human beings actually 
behave in the world outside the law‟s abstract world. 
 
Similar issues arose in the case of PCN. The operations of the legal 
system in PCN also confirm that the legal system‟s functional 
requirements operate to restrict its ability to respond to the needs of 
maltreated children.  The functional requirement for binary alternatives 
restricts the legal system to responding reactively and choosing between, 
generally, two alternatives. In PCN this led the legal system to focus on 
the relationships of adults, rather than on the interests of the children.  
Secondly, PCN also confirms that the legal system‟s attempts to 
incorporate the insights of the social sciences in the creation of the law 
can fail to deliver any real benefits because of the operative closure 
arising from the law‟s reductionist approach to language and the 
production of knowledge.  By using its own models of language and rights 
to interpret the wishes of children, the law can overlook alternative 
interpretations and an appreciation for the context dependent and 
purposive nature of communication.   
 
Throughout this thesis I have referred to the role of power in shaping both 
the law and society.  Children in our society are treated differently to 
adults.  Although in part this recognises the physical realities of childhood, 
it also reflects a difference in the ability of children to exercise social 
power.  In many ways, children are powerless.  In contrast, the law is a 
system founded on the exercise of power.  This is particularly evident in 
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rights discourses as rights are designed to redistribute social power.  
Many of the limitations the law faces when responding to child 
maltreatment are the result of using a system of power such as the law to 
respond to the needs of the powerless. 
 
All of these factors contribute to the legal system‟s operative closure; 
closure that restricts the law‟s ability to respond to the subjectively 
experienced needs of children and to reform society to protect them from 
maltreatment.  Although the law may be able to exercise its power once 
maltreatment has occurred or act symbolically to expound norms of 
appropriate behaviour, it only has a limited ability to act proactively to 
prevent maltreatment and change human behaviour.  Furthermore, the 
legal system‟s operative closure is an inescapable element of the legal 
system given its functional requirements and role in society. In short, the 
law has no “magical power” to protect children.582  
 
I have written this thesis in an attempt to identify ways in which New 
Zealand society can act to protect all children in New Zealand from 
maltreatment.  I have concluded that the legal system is operationally 
closed and therefore limited in its ability to protect children from 
maltreatment.  I therefore make the following recommendations for those 
who want to protect children in New Zealand from maltreatment: 
 
1. Attempts to protect children need to move beyond law reform to 
address the wider context of children‟s lives through social policy 
initiatives that address issues such as poverty, housing difficulties 
and cultural conceptions regarding the acceptability of family 
violence. Although advocates for children generally recognise the 
importance of a contextual response to child maltreatment, the 
conclusions of this thesis emphasise the importance of this 
approach.  Although changing the law may be politically expedient 
(it is relatively cheap, fast and public), the claims of expedience 
need to be resisted if children are to be protected.  
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2. To overcome operative closure, consideration should be given to 
changing the way in which decisions are made within New 
Zealand‟s family law system.  Legally trained judges currently make 
such decisions and this prioritises the discursive processes of the 
legal system in the law‟s decision-making processes.  
Consideration should therefore be given to providing for decision-
making panels that could include lawyers and experts from the 
social sciences. Alternatively, the qualifications for Family Court 
judges could be altered to require not only legal but psychological 
or social work expertise and experience. 
 
Although these recommendations are important, the focus of this thesis 
has been to develop an understanding of the way in which the law 
operates.  By contributing to an understanding of the way in which the law 
operates on a systemic level, I hope that this thesis will enable debate 
regarding New Zealand society‟s response to child maltreatment to 
proceed on a fully informed and therefore more effective basis. 
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